At 14:20 03/07/04 -0400, Kory Heath wrote:

Yes, but some confusions are so easy to avoid! Confusions will always appear in the middle of conversations, but I want them at least to be unexpected ones...! Anyway, I didn't mean to derail the conversation with my "jargoning"; I was just pointing out that whenever I see "platonism" in one of these conversations, I'm never sure what we're really talking about.

`No problem. Let us use "arithmetical realism", (for the belief that any (close) arithmetical`

formula is either true or false, independently of us). I mean first order logic formula ... for those who know what I mean (cf Podnieks page if some wants to know that urgently).

formula is either true or false, independently of us). I mean first order logic formula ... for those who know what I mean (cf Podnieks page if some wants to know that urgently).

`Now I recall the problem: by UDA physics (in world/state /situation A) is given by a measure on all "computationnal histories" going through A and as "seen" from A.`

`The strategy I have followed consist to ask a sound universal machine what she thinks about that question. I translate the "world/state/situation A" by a (finite or infinite) set of provable (DU accessible) arithmetical propositions, and I translate "all computationnal histories" by the set of all maximal consistent extensions of A. Then I show that the "measure one" or "probability one" propositions p must satisfy the following conditions:`

1) to be true everywhere (= true in all maximal consistent extensions, = []p)

2) to be true somewhere (= true in some consistent extensions, = <>p)

(by Godel "1)" does not imply "2)" from the machine in A perspective!)

This is enough to prove that the "probability 1" is quantum like. The miracle comes from the

strange and counter-intuitive behavior of the Godel beweisbar (provability) [] predicate.

1) to be true everywhere (= true in all maximal consistent extensions, = []p)

2) to be true somewhere (= true in some consistent extensions, = <>p)

(by Godel "1)" does not imply "2)" from the machine in A perspective!)

This is enough to prove that the "probability 1" is quantum like. The miracle comes from the

strange and counter-intuitive behavior of the Godel beweisbar (provability) [] predicate.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/