Hal Ruhl wrote:

I think it would be simpler if you responded directly to quotes from my previous post, rather than just making general statements about issues raised in that post. For example, here you continue to *assert* that there is something inherently time-based about logical statements, but you don't in any way explain what is wrong with my counterargument from that post:

I was still having reading difficulties with my new lenses so this was easier for me.

OK, no problem.

'The laws of logic need not be thought of as rules of "discovery", they can be thought of purely as expressing

"Expressing" seems to be a time dependent process.

I don't think it needs to be. When we say a certain set of symbols "expresses" something, in the most abstract sense we're just saying there's a mapping between the symbols and some meaning.

static relationships between static truths, relationships that would exist regardless of whether anyone contemplated or "discovered" them.

As are my kernels of information.

For example, in every world where X and Y are simultaneously true, it is also true that X is true, even if no one notices this.'

Sure, That is a kernel. Observation does not make a kernel a kernel.

OK, but this isn't really relevant to my question, namely, why does any of this require time?

Likewise, you didn't address my point that "I can't think of any historical examples of new mathematical/scientific/philosophical ideas that require you to already believe their premises in order to justify these premises",

I believe Bruno said that some information systems included a set of beliefs. As I recall the "premises" are these beliefs. Justification comes from emotions [based on other beliefs] surrounding the resulting system such as simplicity, elegance of apparent explanation etc. So it seems to me that justification is part of belief.

My point is that if I want to demonstrate the truth of some statement X to you (without appealing to new empirical evidence), I look for some set of premises that we *already* share, and then try to show how these premises imply X. I can't think of any historical example where someone's new idea is accepted by other people without the person appealing to common premises they already share. Can you?

and you didn't address my question about whether you think there could be a world/kernel where a vehicle simultaneously

Again time inserts itself as the notion of "simultaneously".

"Simultaneously" shouldn't be taken too literally, "X and Y are simultaneously true" is just a shorthand way of saying that X and Y are truths that both apply to exactly the same domain, whether "same domain" means "same universe", "same time", or whatever. For example, if I say "Ronald Reagan was President of the U.S. in 1985" and "Bill Clinton was President of the U.S. in 1995", these are two non-contradictory truths that apply to the domain of "U.S. history in our universe", so in that sense they are "simultaneous" truths about this domain even though they refer to different dates. On the other hand, if I said "Ronald Reagan was President of the U.S. in 1985" and "Lex Luthor was President of the U.S. in 1985", and both applied to the domain of "U.S. history in our universe", then this would be a contradiction. But if I made clear that the first statement applied to the domain of "U.S. history in our universe" and the second applied to the domain of "U.S. history in an alternate universe" then there would no longer be any contradiction in these statements.

had different numbers of wheels,

If the world was a CA and half the applicable cells were in a two wheel state and half in a three wheel state what would that be?

I can't really picture a CA where the state of a cell specified a number of wheels, but never mind--this would clearly involve no contradiction, because the statements "the cell is in a 2-wheel state" and "the cell is in a 3-wheel state" would not apply to the same domain, since they refer to two *different* cells. There is only a logical contradiction here if both apply to exactly the same domain--in this case, the same cell in the same "world" at a single time. Do you think it could be possible for two contradictory statements about the state of a single cell at a single moment in a single world to *both* be true?

Should we have the hubris to impose this somewhat questioned concept on all other universes? In my view the states of all universes preexist in the All [as some of the kernels] and "Physical Reality" washes over them in some sequentially inconsistent way.

So do believe the statement "the states of all universes don't preexist in the All, and 'Physical Reality' does not wash over them in any sequentially inconsistent way" would be false? If so, it seems that you yourself have the "hubris" to apply the logical law of noncontradiction to statements about reality as a whole.

I am just try to think of the simplest system that contains no information and yet has a dynamic that could support what might be the universe some may believe they inhabit.

But then is there really a process like "think"?

The All as I defined it [my current proposed belief] contains a kernel for the Nothing as well as a kernel for the All thus the nesting.

From the inside perspective we are forced to be in, all we have to justify such a belief system is our own beliefs re efficiency, beauty, etc. etc. so our beliefs justify our beliefs. Is this not self referential? I do not intend to impose that on the system as a whole.

You didn't really answer my question above. What I'm asking is, every time you make a statement about reality as a whole, do you intend to deny that the negation of your statement is true? For example, above you say that "The All contains a kernel for the Nothing as well as a kernel for the All." If I make the statement "The All does *not* contain a kernel for the Nothing *or* a kernel for the All", would you then say my statement is false? Please give me a yes-or-no answer to this question, if at all possible.

I do not agree with your "rather" based cancelation of the residual information issue since I see it as an unnecessary complication of my own method.

I'm not sure what you mean by "rather based cancellation." If you're talking about my point that every statement could be simultaneously true and false if you throw out the laws of logic, obviously *I* don't believe this is a good way to solve the "residual information issue", since I think it's nonsensical to allow logical contradictions. But since you seem to be saying the laws of logic aren't absolute, I was just pointing out that you would have no basis for denying that statements about reality can be simultaneously true and false. If you say that it is an "unnecessary complication" to allow statements about reality as a whole to be both true and false, then you are in effect saying it would be an unnecessary complication to claim that the laws of logic don't apply to reality as a whole!

I just believe in my own sense of neatness. You gave two apparently contradictory statements which when put in the same pot seem to sum to what I propose for the whole system absent the "rather". I wish to avoid including our "laws of logic" as a necessary component of a kernel.

But if you "wish to avoid" allowing statements about reality to be both true and false, that means you "wish to avoid" allowing reality as a whole to contain logical contradictions! The two ideas are exactly equivalent.

My point is that it is more pleasing to think of the dynamic as being inconsistent [each state has no cause effect link of any sort to any other state] if there are other components of the All that are inconsistent. But these are not really the same thing and I begin to think the latter is a side bar issue.

There is nothing "inconsistent" in a logical statement about having no causal links between states--such an idea does not imply any logical contradictions (ie it doesn't imply that two contradictory statements can both be true in precisely the same domain). I think you are misunderstanding what the "laws of logic" really mean, examples like different cells of a cellular automata having different states or different states in a series having no causal relationship to one another don't contradict the laws of logic in any way.

Does that mean you say the statement "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state" is false?

I believe we should avoid applying logic to a zero internal information entity such as the All. I believe this causes problems.

You didn't answer my question. Would you say the statement "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state" is false, or would you say it's true, or would you say it is neither true nor false, or what?

As to does mathematics contain information, mathematics has the potential to erect boundaries so by my definition it is information.

But doesn't *any* statement you make about reality as a whole, like "each state of that dynamic has to be completely independent of the current state", erect a "boundary" between itself and its negation, in this case "each state of the dynamic is completely dependent on the current state"?

I distinguish between actual boundaries and the potential to erect one. The All is full of boundaries between kernels but has no potential to erect more. In your "dependent" case one has to manage the dependency rules - a necessary potential to erect boundaries.

How about the statement "The All is full of boundaries between kernels but has no potential to erect more". Isn't there a "boundary" between this statement and its opposite, namely "The All contains no boundaries between kernels but does have potential to erect more"? Would you say the first statement is true and the second is false?


Reply via email to