Hal wrote > Lee Corbin writes: > > Why not instead adopt the scientific model? That is, that > > we are three-dimensional creatures ensconced in a world > > governed by the laws of physics, or, what I'll call the > > "atoms and processes" model. About observer-moments, I would > > say what LaPlace answered to Napoleon about a deity: > > "I have no need of that hypothesis". > > Observer moments are more than a hypothesis, they are our raw experiences > of the world. It is more the world that is the hypothesis to explain > the observer moments, than vice versa. "I think, therefore I am... an > observer moment," as Descartes meant to say.
Yes, I had overstated my case. Thanks for the correction. Still, on a certain literal level, I meant what I said: as an *hypothesis*, I have no need of observer-moments (any more, say, that I would require the existence of telephones as part of a scientific *hypothesis*). But I regret implying that I thought they did not exist. > However, given the strong evidence we have for the world's existence and > the explanatory power it gives for our experience, I don't think there > is a problem with treating it as fundamental. This leads to a model of > world -> observers -> observer-moments. Yes, thank you. This is exactly the ontology I had in mind. As another example, laws-of-physics -> atoms-and-minerals -> telephone-sets. I have no need of an hypothesis that begins with either observers, observer-moments, or consciousness. > A key point is that the mapping is not just one-to-many. It is > many-to-many. That is, an observer moment is shared among multiple > observers; and an observer exists in multiple worlds. Certainly. This is the usual point of view from the MWI. You continue: > [i] observers merge whenever information is forgotten. And they > diverge whenever information is learned. > [ii] observers exist in any world which is consistent with their > observations. Basically, yes. But your second point, which I've labeled (ii), I think has to be modified in this direction: while it's true that I am "in" any universe where I'm observing exactly the same sights, sounds, and tactile sensations (regardless of their actual histories), it's necessary that it be *me* there, and not Joe Schmoe. This is accomplished by introducing a second axis that is calibrated by how similar are the internal reactions of the entity to mine. Now the set of my observations lies on a continuum (e.g., if the colors I'm seeing become too garish or the shapes I'm seeing become too unfamiliar, then it's less an observer-moment that *I'm* having and more one that someone else is having). Likewise, the set of my internal reactions to my observations lie on a continuum. Sure, there are Lee Corbins with tails who are seeing exactly what I'm seeing and typing exactly what I'm typing, but some of them are a lot angrier and more upset than I am at having been corrected, and so the coefficient of personal identity falls off along this axis too with distance. > I see both views - worlds as primary, or observers and observer-moments as > primary - as playing an important role in understanding our relationship > to the multiverse. Please explain why observers and observer-moments should sometimes be regarded as primary. They're completely derivative in my ontology. Of course, it's extremely common for derivative entities, like marks on a whiteboard exhibiting mathematical relationships, or telephone-sets, or DNA, to be important along the road of making further predictions and affording further explanations. But still, all those things, (like "observers" and "observer-moments" for me) don't feel fundamental. Not as fundamental, for example, as the Standard Model. You then outline a nice program for making computations based upon observer-moments. > ... > This approach seems to require acknowledgement of the fundamental > importance both of worlds and observer-moments. We use worlds to > calculate measure; we use observer-moments to constrain the set of worlds > that we occupy, now and in the future. A world-only approach would seem > to pin us to a single world and not recognize that we span all worlds > which contain identical observer-moments; Well, I was taking "world-only" to include all our best theories of physics, in particular QM. And the MWI interpretation of QM of course leads us to observer-moments. It didn't occur to me to restrict "world" to just one spacetime. Lee
