> We had some discussion of Maudlin's paper on the everything-list in 1999.
> I summarized the paper at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m898.html .
> Subsequent discussion under the thread title "implementation" followed
> I suggested a flaw in Maudlin's argument at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1010.html with followup
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1015.html .
> In a nutshell, my point was that Maudlin fails to show that physical
> supervenience (that is, the principle that whether a system is
> conscious or not depends solely on the physical activity of the system)
> is inconsistent with computationalism.
It seemed to me that he made a leap at the end.
> (In fact, I argued that the new computation is very plausibly conscious,
> but that doesn't even matter, because it is sufficient to consider that
> it might be, in order to see that Maudlin's argument doesn't go through.
> To repair his argument it would be necessary to prove that the altered
> computation is unconscious.)
I know that Hal participated in a discussion on Extropians in 2002 or 2003
concerning Giant Look-Up Tables. I'm surprised that either in the course
of those discussions he didn't mention Maudlin's argument, or that I have
Doesn't it all seem of a piece? We have, again, an entity that either
does not compute its subsequent states, (or as Jesse Mazer points out,
does so in a way that looks suspiciously like a recording of an actual
The GLUT was a device that seemed to me to do the same thing, that is,
portray subsequent states without engaging in bonafide computations.
Is all this really the same underlying issue, or not?