Le 22-mai-05, à 10:13, Lee Corbin a écrit :


[Stathis] Perhaps this is true, but it is
not logically consistent to say that it must be true and still maintain the 1st person/ 3rd person distinction we have been discussing. This is because the whole point of the distinction is that it is not possible to deduce or
understand that which is special about 1st person experience (namely,
consciousness) from an entirely 3rd person perspective.

Yes, in other words, it is ineffable.


Exactly. Like consistency for sound or just consistent machines, if you simplify "ineffable" by unprovable. (Godel's second incompleteness theorem)

Please, don't infer that I identify consciousness and consistency, but I do think consciousness is a "logical descendant" of consistency.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


Reply via email to