Le 03-juin-05, à 06:20, Lee Corbin a écrit :
[Stephen:] What if "I", or any one else's 1st person aspect, can not
If the operation of copying is impossible, what is the status of all
of these thought experiments?
I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of
Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are
Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity. Show more
precisely that IF I am duplicable at some description level THEN if I
observe myself below that substitution level I will discover that I am
made from "object" relying on an infinity (a continuum) of information
states/histories (hardly duplicable "stuff"). Hint: (re)read the UDA.
Exercise 2) (For Stephen :) Show that the 1-person is not 1-duplicable,
show that it is not even 1-nameable. (This can be done also by a
qualitative informal reasoning, but it is also beautifully obtainable
with G and G*, S4Grz, ...)