Le 05-juin-05, à 19:45, Lee Corbin a écrit :
Bruno provides the exercise
I notice that many people seek refuge in the "no-copying" theorem of
Exercise: 1) Show by a qualitative informal reasoning that if we are
Turing emulable then a no-cloning theorem is a necessity.
My best guess right now? Your challenge would be a futile exercise
in word play! "no-cloning" involves quantum mechanics.
I don't think QM has a copyright on the non copy theorems!
I have been prudent enough to talk on "a", and not "the"
Zurek-Wootters-Diecks non copy theorems. In france there is a law of
non cloning of embryo. What are you saying?
So far as
I know, computability theory (e.g. Rogers 1967) says ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING about quantum mechanics, and they are in two completely
different intellectual domains.
Why does the David Deutsch FOR book mention comp/turing as an important
thread of the book. Everett uses comp in its derivation of the
collapse. I'm glad you mention Rogers' classical introduction to
computability theory, which is excellent, but is a book on pure
computability theory, not on applied computability theory. Since when
is it forbidden to apply one field on another. I really don't
understand your remark.
All what I say is that someone who understands the 8 UDA steps should
easily be able to convince him/herself that whatever matter could *be*,
it cannot be cloned. This can be shown in a short sentence. It is
almost trivial. (once UDA is thoroughly understood: this is probably
less trivial, and from your conversation with Stathis I can infer you
have trouble at the step 3, in the SANE paper:
Let me know when the newspapers announce that you've derived
QM from computability theory.
I have only show that if comp is true then QM is derivable from comp
I do have derive a little bit of QM.
Or any blasted physics equation
whatsoever. (I'm sorry that I have neither the time nor the
expertise to digest your technical papers.)
Except the step 7 which need a passive understanding of Church's
thesis, there is nothing technical in the UDA reasoning. I agree the
interview of the machine on UDA is more difficult, because it
presupposes some background in logic and computability theory. But it
is not necessary for the understanding of the UDA (universal dovetailer
argument) which gives the main result.
In another thread, Bruno wrote
This is the central problem from those who are deeply concerned as
to *why* 1st person experiences exist. Too bad that to me, it's
just obvious that they must. I literally cannot conceive of how
it could be different! (Poor me, I suppose---in some ways some
of us just have too little imagination, I truly guess.)
The problem is not so much "why" 1-person experiences exist, but how
they are related to 3-person descriptions, and which one.
How do *you* explain the relation?
If I were a great novelist, I might be able to convey certain 1st
person experiences to you (but that is possible *only* because the
two organisms Bruno and Lee are so similar). But I'm not a great
novelist, and so I can't.
Here you make the category error which is made by so many physicalists
or materialists. I am not asking you to convey some of your first
person experience (well actually with your aargh and other humbug you
do succeed but that's beyond the poin :).
But at least you accept the existence of those 1-experience (unlike the
materialist eliminativist a-la-Churchland). My question is how do you
related them to third person describable things?
Therefore, we can only talk about what is in the world, from tables
to trees to mountains and stars.
Ah ? This is a so ambiguous statement that I cannot comment it.
*People* occupy an infinitesimal
portion of what's out there. The maze of internal events which make
each one of them feel and think is interesting, but is a very difficult
It is a physiological problem once you are both computationalist and
physicalist, but UDA shows those two options are incompatible. Please
tell me where I am wrong. If you want we can go step by step with
little posts. I am afraid you take for granted, perhaps unconsciously
Aristotle theory of mind and substance. It just does not work with
I claim that it has nothing to do with serious
You talk of serious philosophy, but are explicitly against the use of
definition and postulates (axioms) in some of your posts. How could we
progress. Beside I don't believe in some clear boundary between science
and philosophy. Those are, imo, purely conventional construct. In
France and Belgium philosophy belongs to literature.
and is just a hideous distraction, possibly stemming from
confusion at the semantic level and disturbed sr. Bad epistemology,
in a phrase.
I could agree if you give arguments. Without arguments it just looks
like insults (almost).
THERE ISN'T A PROBLEM!
(Yes, okay, to computer scientists and
physiologists there is, but not to philosophers or others interested
in getting their ontology and epistemology straight.) The evolved
creatures all have their responses and their internal workings;
and that's *all* there is to it!
You do confuse here 1-discourse and 3-discourse. It is easy to build
machine capable of reporting their internal states. But that does not
explain the presence of qualia associate with those reports. On the
contrary pure 3-explanation of those self-referential reports seems to
evacuate the need of the internal and non communicable qualia. Note
that this is really what I have solved in the comp-frame with the
Lobian machine interview, and this, I accept, is more difficult to
grasp than just UDA. I agree that for many, it is hard to understand
the mind-body problem, but I think this is due to some blind
acceptation of aristotle naturalism.
I am an evolved creature; and if I can't understand that that same
conclusions apply just as much to me as to the creatures I study,
then I'm yielding to nonsense.
Here I totally agree with you. But that does not per se evacuate the
qualia problem, which is a problem for me *and* for the Lobian machines
I study, for exemple.