Bruno Marchal writes:

But the basic idea is simple perhaps: Suppose I must choose betweena) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will get an orange juice and 9will be tortured.b) I am 3-multiplied in ten exemplars. One will be tortured, and 9 willget a glass of orange juice instead.OK. Now, with comp, strictly speaking the 1-uncertainty are ill-defined,indeed. Because the uncertainty bears on the maximal histories. Withoutprecision I would choose "b".But if you tell me in advance that all the 9 guys in "b", who got theorange juice, will merge (after artificial amnesia of the details whichdiffer in their experience), and/or if you tell me also that the one whowill be tortured will be 3- multiplied by 1000, after the torture, thischange the number of relative histories going through the 1-state"orange-juice" or "tortured" in such a way that it would be better that Ichoose "a". Obviously other multiplication events in the "future" couldalso change this, so that to know the real probabilities, in principle youmust evaluate the whole histories going through the states.To be sure, the reasoning of Stathis is still 100% correct with comp forwhat he want illustrate, but such probability calculus should not beconsidered as a mean to evaluate "real probabilities". When you look at themath, this can be described by conflict between local information andglobal information. It is all but simple. Today I have only "solve" the"probability 1" case, and it is enough for seeing how quantum proba couldbe justify by just comp. But even this case leads to open math questions.It is tricky in QM too.

`I was with you until you proposed the tortured copy in (a) be multiplied`

`1000-fold or the 9 orange juice copies in (b) be merged. I would *still*`

`choose (a) in these situations. I look at it in two steps. The first step is`

`exactly the same as without the multiplying/merging, so at this point (a) is`

`better. If you had then proposed something like, the orange juice copies`

`will then be tortured, then that would have made a difference to my choice.`

`What you in fact proposed is that the absolute measure of the tortured`

`copies be subsequently increased or the absolute measure of the orange juice`

`copies be subsequently decreased. I would argue that changing the absolute`

`measure in this way can make no possible first person difference; or,`

`equivalently, that multiplying or reducing the number of instantiations of`

`an observer moment makes no possible first person difference - it's all the`

`one observer moment. What does make a difference is the *relative* measure`

`of candidate successor OM's, and it is crucial that this refers to the`

`transition from one OM to the next. This is simply because that is how our`

`minds perceive the passage of time and construct the illusion of a single`

`individual who maintains his identity over time.`

--Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________

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