Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question? If you want to insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to figure out).
If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I am copy #1 in washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained? This seems to be the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies 1st person phenomena. Jonathan Colvin >Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is >strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and >not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly >unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate >explanation (assuming c.). > >Bruno > > >Le 16-juin-05, à 23:02, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > >> Le Jeudi 16 Juin 2005 10:02, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : >>> Switch the question. Why aren't you me (Jonathan Colvin)? I'm >>> conscious (feels like I am, anyway). >> >> Hi Jonathan, >> >> I think you do not see the real question, which can be formulated >> (using your >> analogy) by : >> >> Why (me as) Russell Standish is Russell Standish rather Jonathan >> Colvin ? I (as RS) could have been you (JC)... but it's a fact that >> I'm not, but the question is why I'm not, why am I me rather >than you >> ? What "force" >> decide >> for me to be me ? :) >> >> Quentin >> >> >http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >
