Le 17-juin-05, à 19:44, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :

Bruno wrote:

Note that the question why am I me and not my brother is
strictly equivalent with why am I the one in Washington and
not the one in Moscow after a WM duplication. It is strictly
unanswerable. Even a God could not give an adequate
explanation (assuming c.).

Ok, does that not imply that it is a meaningless question?

Not at all.

If you want to
insist that this question is meaningful, I don't see how this is possible without assuming a dualism of some sort (exactly which sort I'm trying to
figure out).

If the material universe is identical under situation (A) (I am copy #1 in washington) and (B) (I am copy#2 in washington), then in what way does it
make sense to say that situation A OR situation B might have obtained?

Just ask the one in Washington. He will tell you that he feels really be the one in washington. The experience from his personal point of view *has* given a bit of information "he feels himself to be the one in washington, and not in Moscow". At this stage he can have only an intellectual (3-person) knowledge that its doppelganger has been reconstituted in Moscow. And he remember "correctly by comp" his past history in Brussels. It is even simpler to reason by assuming, well not comp, but the fact that the reasoner believes in comp, not as a philosopher, but as someone practicing comp everyday. He believes that, as far as he is consistent he will remain consistent (or alive with its correct memories) after a teletransportation from Brussels to Mars. An independant unknown reconstitution elsewhere will not change the fact that he survives. So he believes he will survive a duplication, in the same mundane sense that he would survive a medical operation. Only, he can by introspection realize that the reconstitution will break the 3-symmetry of the duplication. By numerical identity and 3-symmetry he knows he will no convey one bit of information to an external observer (by saying I am the one in W), but he *knows* he is the one in w, like the other konws he is the one in m. (unless he is transformed into a zombie after the duplication, but by definition of comp that should not happen). The "or" situation makes sense from the first person point of views. Then, by introspective anticipation the one in brussels will infer he is just maximally ignorant about where, in W or M he feel to be after the experiment will be done.

This seems to be the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies 1st
person phenomena.

You are right, but only from the naturalist/physicalist/materialist theoretical point of view. With comp I suspect (let us say) that it is the crux of the objection to any theory which reifies the 3 person phenomena (except a part of arithmetic). The fact is that when I have a headache, or just when someone I care off has a headache, I am not sure I find even just polite the accusation of reification. If I am the one with the headache, I would consider as a lie to myself to believe I am reifying the headache. Contrarily if you tell me there are moon, galaxies, big bangs and gluons, and when I ask you the evidences, you can give me only numbers which represent relative but apparently stable relation with other numbers. This I don't take as an evidence for moons and gluons, but only as evidence that we probably share a long and non trivial comp history. But with comp, the stability of that history is in need to be explained, without reifying anything substancial, material or physical: it *is* the 1-dragon problem.



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