I (Jonathan Colvin) wrote: > > > >When you press the button in the torture room, there is a > > 50% chance > > > >that your next moment will be in the same room and and a > > 50% chance > > > >that it will be somewhere else where you won't be > > tortured. However, > > > >this constraint has been added to the > > > >experiment: suppose you end up the copy still in the > torture room > > > >whenever you press the button. After all, it is certain > that there > > > >will be a copy still in the room, however many times the > button is > > > >pressed. Should this unfortunate person choose the coin > > toss instead? > > > > > >If he shares your beliefs about identity, then if he changes > > his mind > > >he will be be comitting the gambler's fallacy. > > > > > >However, after having pressed the button 100 times and with > > nothing to > > >show for it except 100 tortures, his faith that he is a > > random observer > > >might be shaken :). > > > > Yes, but do you agree it is the same for any probabilistic > experiment > > in a many worlds cosmology? If you sit down and toss a coin > 100 times > > in a row, there will definitely be one version of you who > has obtained > > 100 heads in a row, just as there will definitely be one version of > > you (the one still in the torture room) who has nothing to > show after > > pushing the button 100 times. > > Yes, I agree. There are always going to be an unfortunate few. > > I think I know where this is going; if manyworlds is correct, > there will be 10<sup>100 copies of me created in the next > instant to which nothing bad happens, and a much smaller > measure to whom something nasty happens, quite by chance. > Presumably if I choose 50% over 10 copies, I should also > choose 50% over 10<sup>100 copies, so if given the option > between the status quo (assuming manyworlds) and a seemingly > much higher chance of something nasty happening, I should > choose the higher chance of nastiness (if I'm being consistent). > > There's not much answer to that; probably if I was convinced > that manyworlds is correct, and something nasty *is* bound to > happen to a small number of me in the next instant, I *would* > choose the copies. In our thought experiment the subject > knows he's getting tortured; unless we can prove manyworlds > the nastiness is only conjecture. > > If that wasn't where you were heading, forgive the presumption... :)
Ok, you've convinced me (or did I convince myself?). I've joined the ranks of the button pushers (with large number of copies anyway). But the probabilities seem to make a difference. For instance if there's a 50% chance of torture vs. 3 copies with one getting tortured for sure, I'll still choose the 50%. Don't ask me at which number of copies I'll start pushing the button; I dunno. Jonathan Colvin
