Dear Lee, and Stathis,

I have been pondering the various threads discussing OMs and "continuity" requirements and have a couple of questions.

----- Original Message ----- From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <>
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 11:04 PM
Subject: RE: Torture yet again

Stathis writes
I [may] have to say that we are two different people when we
are separated by time as well as space or across parallel
universes. What I would say is that my successor tomorrow
is potentially "me" if there is continuity of consciousness
between all the intermediates between now and then.
I'm skeptical of "continuity" requirements. Now I do not believe in
Greg Egan's equations in "Permutation City": according to a premise
of the story, it order to obtain the you of tomorrow, there is a
short-cut alternative to just letting you run.  And that is to
determine the solutions of an immense number of differential
equations that do not in fact emulate your intermediary states.
If this were so, then it may be that you could discontinuously
skip past all of tonight and tomorrow's experiences, and just
start living by directly experiencing the day after that.


Does it not seem that the continuity requirement is such that it only comes up when we consider either an external 3rd person P.o.V. of a OM chaining P.o.V. or an internal 1st person of a memory of having changed one's mind about something is some other OM?

It's easy to imagine this being possible; when I was a teen and
was faced with the loathsome task of mowing the lawn, I wondered
if it could be possible for me to just not have that experience
at all, but for my life to just magically resume after the chore
was completed (somehow).  I was aware that what I wanted was not
simply memory erasure.


If we erase our memories of having done the loasome event after actually going through it, do we not need to also erase the memory of any other witness that might be able to remind us of the event? How can a OM encode a trace of other OMs such that it can capture the notion of "remembering something"?

The successor of my duplicate with the headache does not satisfy
this criterion and is therefore not potentially "me".
Well, are you sure?  What if he takes a memory-erasure pill
(that works much more perfectly than Midazolam) and thereby
becomes a past state that is identical to one of "your"
past states, and then evolves forward into states that you
definitely consider to be your natural successors.


   What, exactly makes me "me"? Is it "I am what I remember myself to be"?

After people are uploadable, this could happen without much
fuss all the time. The interplay of and algebraic combinatorial
possibilities of *memory addition*, *experience*, and *memory
erasure* lead back to the notion that one is just a fuzzy set
in the collection of all persons or person-states.


This scenario sound to me like a MWI version of time travel, where "erasure" happens everywhere to the memories of possible witnesses but not to the person doing the time traveling. Thus, if the time traveler takes a Blue Pill evertime he steps into the Time Machine portal, he, from his P.O.V. dies and from the P.o.V. of some witness (to his stepping thru the portal) just vanishes.

   Am I missing something here?

Arbitrary though this criterion for continuity of identity
may be, it is the criterion our minds have evolved with,
and calling it irrational will not change that fact.
Well, some of this is involuntary, but some of it is not.
I've never seen how to shake *anticipation*, for example,
and suppose that we're just stuck with it, problems and
all. But actually I don't have any problem believing that
I *am* my duplicates, even those across the room, who are
just me seeing a different perspective of the room (and
perhaps having slightly different thoughts).


I don't have any problem believing that I *am* all of my duplicates either, so long as there is some way that the "me" that I remember now could be smoothly continued within the world of a duplicate *and* all witnesses agree that I did all that I claim I did with in that world. Otherwise, I will need some serious phychiatric help for my Schitzophrenia! (Ever watch the movie "12 Monkeys"?)

If we are to be strictly rational and consistent, it
is simplest to go to the extreme of saying that *none*
of the instantiations of an individual are actually the
"same" person, which is another way of saying that each
observer moment exists only transiently. This would mean
that we only live for a moment, to be replaced by a copy
who only thinks he has a past and a future.


Exactly what is the definition of "rational" here? Is it the same as my implied "sane", e.g. not schitzophrenic?

Mike Perry, in his book "Forever For All" develops these
from the idea of "day-persons", i.e., the idea that you
are not the same person from day to day. But that's
certainly not a satisfactory way of extending our usual
notions into these bizarre realms; you and I want to live
next week because we believe that we are the same persons
we'll be then.  And the idea that we *are* fuzzy sets in
person space permits this.


DOes Mike Perry elaborate on how anyone can know for sure that "they are not the same person from day to day". What does he define "same" to be?

We die all the time, so death is nothing to worry about.
On this definition, yes. But this is *such* an impractical
approach. We all know that it's bad for your neighbor when
he dies, despite us and him totally believing in the MWI.
We would like to avoid having to say that we die all the


Are we really just recoiling in horror at the prospect of our own non-existence (mortality) and trying like madmen to find an escape clause? Isn't this the same motivation that exists at the root of Religions?
   If this is true, can we admit it to ourselves; much like Tippler has?

Kindest regards,


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