Pete Carlton writes:
[quoting Hal Finney]
If imperfect or diverged copies are to be considered as
lesser-degree selves, is there an absolute rule which applies,
an objective reality which governs the extent to which two
different individuals are the same "self", or is it ultimately
a matter of taste and opinion for the individuals involved to
make the determination? Is this something that reasonable
people can disagree on, or is there an objective truth about
it that they should ultimately come to agreement on if they
work at it long enough?
The former. Remember: "There's no arguing about taste".
I agree. And also remember (from David Hume), "In every system of
morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarkd, that the
author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human
affairs; when of a sudden I am surprizd to find, that instead of the
usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no
proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This
change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as
this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, tis
necessary that it shoud be observd and explaind; and at the same time
that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable,
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely
different from it."
That's a great quote! All 20th century analytical philosophy can be seen as
a footnote to David Hume. I often see people who are of a scientific bent
trying to reduce ethics (less often, aesthetics) to a matter of reason. It
can't be done; you might start with logic ("is") but you will end up with
axioms that ultimately are are a matter of taste ("ought").
In other words -- no matter what you think about your degree of identity
to a person, or how many facts you know about the situation you're in,
those facts alone can't tell you how you >should< act.
As to whether duplicates are the same "self", I think this is, again, a
place where "I" leads us astray. Take this situation: I will create an
exact duplicate of you. For one 24-hour period you will, from a remote
location, experience the duplicate living your life (via some
closed-circuit camera and virtual reality goggles, or something). I will
then give you the option of either (1) killing yourself (painlessly,
instantly) and giving the duplicate 5 dollars, or (2) pushing a button
that makes the duplicate vanish, and you go back to your old life as if
nothing happened. Lee would choose option (1), I take it, because he sees
this situation as "I get 5 dollars". I think this interpretation, using
"I", has an unnecessary complication to it. What I think Lee is really
saying (in third person terms) is, "Person A ought to terminate person A's
life, because person A desires the existence of (person B + 5 dollars)
more strongly than he desires the existence of (person A)."
Now we can see that by calling them both "I" or "Lee" or "self", Lee is
merely >providing an ethical justification< to his choice, not making a
metaphysical statement about personal identities. In other words, it is
because he extends the "normal" desire of self- preservation to the
duplicate, that he would accept certain choices. Whether this is in fact
correct is not a scientific question but one for philosophical ethics (and
a very interesting one).
There is only one way to unequivocally define what is a duplicate in the
philosophy of personal identity, and that is a *perfect* duplicate of a
person at a particular point in time. If you suddenly die and such a
duplicate exists, no experiences are lost, and it is in fact equivalent to
not dying at all.
--Stathis Papaioannou
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