To the quote of Lee's remark:
I would try "Vernumft" (which may as well be similarly
inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some
German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively
I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living
complexity which says not much more if 'mentality'
is not properly identified. However referring to the
complexity of the 'living creatures' it points to a
function which is inseparable from the substrate it
goes together with (brain and the rest of the world).
So I would not agree with Baum as to the 'brain'
running the program for thinking, which is a tool in
the complexity 'running' in concert with the rest of
it. Also simulating menatlity from computer
expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI
etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate
certain and very limited items we already discovered
from our "mind".
"Living" I use instead of "human", of course. But that
comes from my generalization trend of terms beyond our
human only pretension.
To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already
HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not.
At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced
--- "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> [Lee wrote:]
> >Interesting note about "mind": there is no German
> >equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very*
> careful when
> >employing it. <Sarcastic comment about the
> possibility of
> >Teutonic zombies elided.>
> >In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, "What
> is Thought?"
> >by Eric Baum, the author decides to use "mind" as
> the name of
> >the program the brain runs, and it seems to work
> out well.
> What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too
> is right in front of me. I conclude there is a
> hidden web cam somewhere in my office.... I love
> causality. :)
> As regards the book contents. I have to go through
> it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes
> precisely the same mistakes as all the other
> functionalists outlined so well in
> Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind.
> Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p.
> Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of
> imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is
> so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore
> there is such things as 'things' in the universe.
> There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have
> no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort
> yet appears to be so. Including Germans!
> Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain
> matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made
> except to shoehorn the received view into the
> Are we ever going to get past this?