Le 05-août-05, à 17:50, chris peck a écrit :
Futhermore, with regards to formal logic, there is some controversy
over how logical operators should be interpreted I gather.
Yes and no. Because their job consists in making mathematical the
interpretations, and then to study completeness, soundness,
independence of the axioms, etc. Nowadys logic is just a branch of
math. Controversy can appear in apllication (but that's true for any
application of math).
Indeed whilst it is possible to derive all operators from just one
(Sheffer's I think), and thus reason to think that this operator is
fundamental in some way, its interpretation however is clearly a
combination of 'english' operators.
That is not a problem at all.
There doesnt appear to be a strict isomorphism between language and
True. But that is not a problem at all. There exists many interesting
and well defined morphisms.
I think Descartes is much maligned actually. Sure, his attempt to
rebuild the world from the cogito fails,
I am not sure. Surely they are many vagueness ...
but his theology and philosophy really just form a tiny part of his
I am not sure of that either.
His work in analytical geometry is testament to how good a
mathematician he was. His study of algebra and curves has been of
unquestionable use to the world.
Sure. Newton did even acknowledge it in ... the *first* edition of his
But Descartes has a coherent view of both theology and sciences. He
oversimplified it a little bit too much for pedagoical purposes, I
guess, and also with an eye on the church authority for escaping
"social difficulties". For most of the time he did not succeed and he
Actually I don't believe in science at all. I believe just in honest
and curious people capable of trying to make clear and sharable
their ideas and works.
Knowledge by any means! I think knowledge in science has a pragmatic
definition. Ideally, a theory has authority over its field to the
degree to which it is of use. More predictive theories replace older
ones, whether or not the older ones strictly speaking have been
falsified. (Newton vs. Einstein). I follow the argument Hilary Putnam
makes in 'The "Corroboration" of Theories', that intertheoretic
dependency renders falsifiability impossible for most theories. I
certainly agree with Feyerabend, and many others, that scientists
usually dont (and shouldnt) worry about falsifiability too much. Given
they shouldnt, and dont, it becomes somewhat fustrating to see
epirical falsification wielded as some great method other disciplines
ignore. So do scientists very often.
The point is that there isnt a 'unique' method that garauntees
futhering knowledge. There are many ways of understanding, and many
ways of enquiring.
Mmmh ... yes sure. But to communicate knowledge you need to find
agreement with the other. Logic, math, and modern axiomatics are
excellent non reductive way to attempt such communications.
How much did relative space/time as concept cost compared to the non
descovery of the Higgs Boson?
I don't know.