Russell said (Hal's paraphrase)
> > > I guess that you would say that if the unused
> > > counterfactual machinery would actually work if tested, then she is
> > > conscious; but if the counterfactual machines were broken or blocked
> > > such that they wouldn't work (even though they are not used) then she
> > > is unconscious. And perhaps you can say that the machines are in fact
> > > tested in other branches of the multiverse, so the criterion is more
> > > than merely a hypothetical difference between unused working machines
> > > and unused broken machines. I see some difficulties with this position
> > > but I better first hear whether this is what you have in mind before
> > > trying to extrapolate further.
> Russell replied:
> > That is indeed my meaning. What difficulties do you see?
There is an almost "practical" objection. After we have robots who
appear to be very conscious in every way, it would be very peculiar
to inquire from one "hey, just how *deterministic* are you?".
If the robot says, "Oh, don't worry, I have a quantum random number
generator built in that guarantees that what I say, do, and think
is slightly but firmly unpredictable in principle. So you see,
I am really conscious."
The other robot says, "I used to believe that. But then one day
I discovered that the chip containing my randomizer had recently
developed problems, and during odd hours I'm fully deterministic,
but not the during even hours. But I *never* notice any difference!
I swear that I'm still conscious [looks inside his head] uh, right now."
Yes, from one philosophical position the second robot's narrative
must be dismissed, but I just don't believe that position.