Le 11-août-05, à 00:55, Lee Corbin a écrit :

Okay, but two questions:

1. by "comp" do you mean the "computationalist hypothesis" as apparently
   used by philosophers?  Is "comp" just an abbreviation for that?

Strictly speaking: yes. It happens now that many people implicitly conceive comp in the materialist framework, and I take it as a result that this does not work. So I (re)define comp, to be sure, in term of the conjonction of the "yes" doctor, arithmetical realism, and Church's thesis.

2. By "Turing-emulable" do you mean that we can be imitated by a
   physical Turing machine (or, what amounts to the same thing),
   by a computer?  Or, instead, are you going to the Pure Platonism,
   with no separate existence of a physical reality required?

It is part of the argument that if you are Turing emulable, then a "physical Turing machine" is part of what emerges from the relation between numbers. This is not so easy to understand, it needs all the UDA (Universal Doevetailer Argument) including either some form of OCCAM and the assesment that a non trivial part of physics has been derived, or, for the "pure proof" without OCCAM, it needs the "movie graph" argument, which is what Maudlin rediscovered with his Olympia and Klara. We will certainly come back on this.

Comp is precisely the conjunction of Church
Thesis, of some amount of belief in arithmetic, + the act of faith
saying "yes" to *some* digitalist surgeon.

And this is the same as saying yes to being uploaded, say, into
a computer?


(I will, for the sake of other readers, even extend
this by stipulating a computer that provides a fully Earth like virtual
reality and which allows multiple mobile sensors on the Earth's
surface so that folks can both feel at home, and also not lose
contact with the actual world.)

Good idea :)

Kind regards,



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