Hi Godfrey:

At 11:21 AM 8/25/2005, you wrote:

[HR]
I am making a distinction between existence and reality. Reality is a transitory state that some definable objects can have. Further I think it is incorrect to try to exclusively argue from a very small sub set [sample] of the objects that can have reality - presumably the states of our universe - back to the system that embeds them.

[GK]
Again, those (states of our universe) are exactly the objects whose reality attribution is more problematic! I am not sure how to drive this point accross to you. There is a paper posted today in the phsyics arXiv that you may want to read as it is
exactly on this subject:

I am still working on the model and will eventually update definitions of the terms used as needed. By "reality" I mean that which allows a SAS to have a sense of "observing". Universe states exist continuously in my All but have transitory reality.


[HR]
If it turns out that quantum mechanics is part of the valid description of our universe [The issue is I believe an open one] then the embedding system should allow for that. This does not preclude other universes for which quantum mechanics is not part of the description.

[GK]
Well, I think it is hard to argue that QM is not a "part of the valid description of our universe" so I cannot agree with you above! All empirical indications, so far, are to the contrary. What is an open question is whether it is the ONLY valid part or whether it is the valid description of the WHOLE universe since we still lack one.

I think we may yet find that QM [as currently formulated] is approximate and/or emergent but Quantification of some sort seems likely to me.

>Now if by "reality" you mean
> platonic reality, I think it is a good question whether such list may > exist or not. You will have to ask a mathematician...

[HR]
I am of the opinion that the line items on my list are just numbers. I believe that most participants in this venue would allow that "Numbers exist" is a possible starting point and that this is could be considered a type of Platonism. I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers].

[GK]
Here I don't fully understand you. I am willing to admit that numbers exist or that they have a reality that is independent of my own existence or yours but I think that means that "numbers have properties" rather than "numbers are properties (of something else)"; if I believe the latter I don't think I could claim to be a platonist...

My: "I just renamed numbers as "properties" so as to include all their interpretations [sets of other numbers]." is the idea that to represent information, numbers must have meaning [interpretations]. A number plus its set of interpretations [other numbers] are a set of properties. A property is also therefore a collection of numbers.

>(I am assuming it is contains an countable infinity of entries, no?)

[HR]
Well there is a difference between listing and counting. I may not be able to count the reals [at least in this universe] but I think a mathematician who allows for continuous dimensions in a 3D space will also allow that in such a space I can list the reals just by drawing a line segment of arbitrary length on a note pad. Since my list has no dimensionality restrictions I suspect it can be one for one with the continuum.

Hal Ruhl

[GK]
Sorry Hal, I don't see very well how a list can be "one-to-one with the continuum"! That may be a default of my imagination...

In response to your question I was just speculating as to whether a "list" is exclusively a discrete item or if a list can also be continuous. Cantor and Turing were using discrete [counting] lists - R1,R2,R3,... and P1,P2,P3... If there is no difference between listing and counting then why have two words? In the above discrete lists the line items are written out natural and real numbers. Writing out a number is just a representation. A discrete list contains representations. A line segment also represents a number. Since a line segment contains all shorter line segments is it a list of all these representations? I do not think the All or the Everything should be restricted to just discrete lists.

Hal Ruhl

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