Re: subjective reality

[Bruno Marchal]

On 02 Sep 2005, at 21:34, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [GK]  Maye you know the links but you surely have not read what they point to otherwise  you would not go on claiming that there are no NON-computable processes in the  physical world!  Please, read what I say. In this list everybody knows that I insist that comp (I am a machine) entails that there is no primitive "physical worlds", and that the appearance of a "physical world" should be non computational. It is the (comp) white rabbits. Reality is full of non-computable processes.  "I am computational" entails that what I see should be non computational *a priori*, but then, by taking the incompleteness phenomenon into account, the reasoning inherit nuances from theoretical computer science. I have already sum up this by the slogan: [Me = a machine] entails [Not me, as seen by me, ≠ all machines]. This is comprehensible only if you understand the difference between notions of first and third person point of view. It would be far easier to follow the 8 steps proof (instead of inferring and attributing propositions I have never made).  The case of the general NON-computability of the results of individual measurements  is somewhat more grievious than all of these because, not only QM does not in general  compute them (but computes their statistical distributions quite generally) but because we  know that NO other conceivable local theory does compute them and furthermore,  no other such theory computes their distribution as well as QM! In fact the only  other "mechanistic" (non-local) theories that can claim to compute anything like the QM distibutions  must contain "faster-than-light" propagations and other features that violate other  well supported physical theories! This later result was proved by George Svetlichny but I am sure you know the link so I need not include it. You make wrong inferences at each paragraph! But in any case nothing you allude to is relevant for the understanding that comp implies the reversal physics/computer-science/number-theory/machine-theology/<call-it-like-you-want>.  I wrote "compute" above where I would normaly write "predict" because physical theories  are really analogue algorithms for computing predictions. Turing machines are very general  (but very slow and ineficient) ways of discretizing and encoding such algorithms and  implementing them in special physical systems called digital computers to generate  approximate predictions. This means that no UTM, no UD or UDA or any model of  digital computation (or any physical, calssical or quantum computer by that matter) that is CT equivalent to them, can compute what QM cannot! Of course. We know this since Deutsch wrote his fundamental paper on quantum universal machine. So if your UDA produces a "huge amount of non-locality" (whatever that  means) I can only understand that as meaning that it computes (predicts) a whole lot less than QM and so, why should I care for it anyway? This is an interesting and hard question. Now, and this is not a coincidence, I think that the easiest and shorter explanation follows directly by the seventh first step of the UDA reasoning. The non-locality and the indeterminacy (and its measure) will be first person (plural) notion (subjective in the sense of Everett). In case UDA's non locality is provably different from the testable non-locality of our "empirical" most probable computational history, then we are done, comp, in the way I make it precise, would be refuted. But when we replace the YD type of grandmother intuition by the possible discourse of the self-referentially classical sound sufficiently rich Universal machine (alias the lobian machine), it appears that the intuitive grandmother indeterminacy inherits a mathematical structures constrained enough to derive, currently, the propositional physics (the logic of yes/no answer). Results have been obtained that this move leads to "some" quantum logic. What form of non-locality? Open problem. But precise enough to be formulated in a decidable theory. We care because the UD argument and its translation offer us a nice alternative by providing a test which either indirectly refute comp or give us an explanation of the origin of (propositional) physics, by traditional "natural" science use of OCCAM. In both case we will learn something which matters for tackling fundamental questions. I know this sounds "didatic" but so do you when you run out of arguments and send people to your papers You are still making inference. And negative one. From this I could quasi-deduce that you have some negative prejudices. This is rather paradoxical given that we agree!!!  (Well, at the grandmother intuitive level). You believe comp is false (by believing YD false), and apparently you believe in some material reality, which is indeed incompatible (explicatively empty) with comp. You should actually appreciate my showing that comp "eliminates" all the physicalist token-substances, given that by believing in that physicalism, it makes you wise to be skeptical on YD. Then I can understand you fear a little bit more the formal elimination of the YD, through the lobian interview, which already retrieve a non trivial propositional physics which until now has confirmed comp and the quantum. You need just to thrust you own belief: if you are right the comp physics will be different from the empirical comp, and we will have precise rational reason to doubt YD. But from what I have derived so far I am already astonished of the resemblance with QM. So the reason why you have that negative attitude is a partial mystery. Those who are *really shocked" by (just) the UDA reversal are the very many who believe strongly in both YD *and*  in the primitiveness of some material substances (more or less the materialists, naturalists, physicalists). Mmh... Well, I see the problem, with your suspicion against YD, you should love UDA, and then it is all normal to hate AUDA (the lobian interview) because it shows that the apparently totally insane conclusion of UDA is not only consistent but also necessary, in some sense. And if comp is true comp is equivalent with QM (or some of its possibly corrected updated version), providing a conceptually simpler explanation of why machines develop beliefs, knowledge, hope, but why its observable and sharable parts take the shape of the mathematical physical laws. I don't understand either why you don't appreciate I refer to my papers. Note that I have given more explanations on-line on the list. In case Escribe works again you can search on the author's name: marchal, marchal bruno, bruno marchal, etc. Look at the links in the archive. But if you want we can do the UDA step b y step, or even the AUDA (in case you are willing to study some mathematical logic books).  Did you (try to) unsubscribe?  Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/