Hal Finney,

You say, ". . . the Church Thesis, which I would paraphrase as saying that 
there are no physical processes more computationally powerful than a Turing 
machine, or in other words that the universe could in principle be simulated 
on a TM.  I wouldn't be surprised if most people who believe that minds can 
be simulated on TMs also believe that everything can be simulated on a TM."

I'm out of my depth here, but this doesn't make sense to me.  My 
understanding is that the Turing Machine is a hypothetical device.  If one 
could be built that operated at faster-than-light or infinite speed, maybe 
it could, in principle, simulate the universe.  However, this isn't 
possible.  Does this mean that the Church Thesis, hence computationalism, 
is, in reality, false?

Norman Samish

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