Ben Goertzel wrote:

My own understanding is that whether Fred, a pigeon or a printer isinvolvedin the experiment should be basically irrelevant. That is, I don't think "registration in consciousness" (whatever that means) is the important thing, but rather registration in the sense of "statistical correlation with some macroscopic system effectively obeying classical probability theory." However, I realize that not everyone agrees with me on this; my reading of Penrose, for instance, is that he would predict a different outcome for 2 versus 1, because he believes that Fred's brain (via unspecified quantum gravity related effects) does something special to collapse the wave function, which the printer does not.

`By the way, I also wanted to point out that this actually isn't Penrose's`

`position, although given his unusual views about the relationship between`

`consciousness and QM it's a pretty common misunderstanding. It's been a`

`while since I read his book, but my memory is that Penrose advocates a`

`"gravitationally-induced collapse" view where the wavefunction of an`

`entangled system spontaneously collapses once it exceeds a certain threshold`

`in mass (due to interactions with the outside world which result in more and`

`more particles becoming entangled with the original system), which he`

`speculates is likely to be around the Planck mass, about 5*10^-8 kg (close`

`to the mass of a flea). He also speculates that the theory of quantum`

`gravity which deals with this may be noncomputable, and that the human brain`

`may somehow take advantage of such noncomputable effects to solve problems`

`that could not be solved by a computational system.`

`The "consciousness collapses the wavefunction" view has been advocated by a`

`few serious physicists like Eugene Wigner, and of course by lots of new-agey`

`types.`

Jesse