So why is it that from the 3rd person point of view everyone dies?

Also along the lines of the "Let There Be Something" thread, isn't it also true that a finite set of finite histories, or even a countable set of infinite histories, is of measure zero in the continuum? If this is the type of selection that is being made from The Multiverse (whose measure >= measure(continuum)) to the "initial" multiverse(s) of your and others' theories, then by the same argument that you use to show that the probability of dying is zero, doesn't this imply that the probability of having such an "initial" multiverse is zero?

I may be in over my head, but if my "Let There Be Something" inquiry is correct, then we're all in over our head.


-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: Everything-List List <>
Sent: Tue, 1 Nov 2005 13:27:27 +0100
Subject: Re: Quantum Immortality (was Re: Quantum Suicide)

Le 28-oct.-05, à 17:54, GottferDamnt a écrit (for-list): 
I would like talk about this quote from an old topic: 
This is a rather shocking conclusion. We are conscious here and 
now because our (computational state) belongs to aleph_1 (or 
2^aleph_0 for those who doesn't want to rely on Cantor's continuum 
hypothesis) infinite computational histories ! 
Remember Brice deWitt shock when he realised that at each instant 
he is multiplied by 10^100. Now it seems that we are multiplied 
by the continuum (!) 
(Moreover this is coherent with the Z modal logics). 
So it seems you are completely right Bob (at least formally), and 
Russell Standish is also right when he said :"Therefore QTI and the 
existence of cul-de-sac branches are a mutual contradiction". 
The pruning of "dead-end" corresponds to the adding of consistency 
(the modal diamond <>) in the modal definition of observation. 
What about these cul-de-sac branches? Is It definitely that
branches can exist with the quantum theory of immortality (for
a state of consciousness which can't be follow)? 
And how comp' Bruno theory manage these cul-de-sac branches? 
I believe that the quantum theory does not allow cul-de-sac branches. 
I also believe that the Godel-Lob theory of self-reference not only allow cul-de-sac branches, but it imposes them everywhere: from all alive states you can reach a dead end.  The Universal Dovetailer Argument shows that the physics (which has no dead ends) should be given by the self-reference logics (with reachable dead end everywhere). 
I have been stuck in that contradiction a very long time ... 
... until I realized the absolute necessity of distinguishing the first and third person point of views. That necessity is implied itself by the incompleteness phenomena, but that is technical (ask me on the everything-list if interested).  The intuitive point here is that you cannot have a first person point of view on your own death: 1-death is not an event, and should be kept out of the domain of verification of probabilistic statements. Another intuition: the finite histories are of measure null among the collection of all histories (the continuum). 

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