Hi Benjamin, List,

I will comment your long post, taking into account some posts from its sequel (to avoid repetition). But I will try to make a sort of synthesis so that people will be able to recast the present thread, concerned with the "theology"-naming issue, and the more general goal of the list which consists globally in the search of a TOE (Theory of Everything) and more particularly consists (at our present stage) to find a measure on the computational histories. For this I need to summarise my own contribution in the list, which consists mainly in explaining results I got in the seventies, published in the eighties (in obscure journals or proceedings though) and eventually defended as a PhD thesis in France in 1998. This includes many things from the necessity of distinguishing first and third person notions, the first person comp indeterminacy, the comp immortality and its "theoretical confirmation" through the quantum suicide and quantum immortality, but mainly all this can be sum up into the "reversal result". This is the result that IF we assume the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science then the physical science cannot be fundamental and are derivable from the "laws of mind". With the comp hyp. the laws of mind can be taken as the laws of computation and computability, although a precise formulation would lead, well, to our current naming issue. The reduction of physics appears to be both epistemological and ontological. That means that not only physics will appear to be a sub-branch of computer science, but that "Matter" is secondary to "Mind". All this in a very precise sense. So precise that the proof I gave is really constructive: it shows how to derive physics from computer science, and the whole technical parts of my thesis (the one which rely on the G-G* logics) consists in the beginning of such a derivation. And then this entails that the comp hyp. (actually even a much weaker hyp.) is empirically testable: just compare the physics extracted from comp and the physics extracted from the usual observation/theory back and forth. And until now I got only confirmation (and not refutation) of comp because I can already shows that comp entails that the logic of the observable is quite a quantum logic. The proof of the reversal is mainly given by the Universal Dovetailer Argument together with either some Occam Razor (the easiest way) or the Movie-Graph Argument (or the latter Maudlin's Olympia). Of course you are not asked to take for granted any of those results. You can either study the UDA (which you have perhaps already done on the list), or you can, just for the sake of the present discussion, keep the result in mind. I would withdraw anything I say in case someone would found an error in the argument.

Now why "theology"?
My answer in a nutshell: because that is the most correct wording, and then I tend to assume, perhaps with a big amount of naïveté, that it is always best to use the (most) correct wording. But I know you and others tend to disagree with this. So before I comment your post, let me explain why I do think "theology" is the correct wording. Note that I have use it in my preliminary long version of my PhD thesis "Conscience & Mécanisme" where I motivate directly the field of modal logic through "theology", seen as a theory of all possible accessible state of mind/consciousness. Those who knows the French or who want to see the drawings can download that pdf-chapter from my web page:
I have been asked by the French not to use that word, and to use the word "psychology" instead. There are many reasons I would like to use again the theological vocabulary for the writing of an English "long version" of the thesis, if only because the psychological wording seems to me less correct (or more faulty). Let me enumerate and briefly describe the reason why "theology" seems suitable:

1) The main one is just to recall the admittedly subtle nature of the comp hyp. It is scientific in the sense of being falsifiable (cf result descibed above), and religious (because there is a sort of promise of "hell" in case you decide to take it for granted).

2) Then there is the one mentioned by George Levy: since the beginning we are talking about the soul, and comp can be sum up into the slogan: I can put my soul on a disc.

3) The notion of first person has as many thing in common with the notion of soul than the notion of soul is different from one theologian to another (so to distinguish "soul" from first-person *is* falling into the 1004-fallacy.

4) Comp-immortality and quantum-immortality. The "immortality" notion is traditionally put in the theological discourses. We talk about this since the beginning.

5) I have already criticise Tegmark for his naïve notion of *all math*. The first mathematician who has try to get a mathematical view of all math, not only did not succeed, but realises that the matter was so theological that he did engage a long correspondance with the theologian of his time. I am talking about Cantor.

6) The main opponent to Cantor is the great topologist Brouwer. Brouwer's critics is also theological, and this is reflected in his youth writing on life consciousness, and mysticism. Brouwer will found the intuitionistic logic (and later we will see that the lobian machine's theory of the soul is quite close to Brouwer's original consciousness theory, with a non nameable self living in a temporal structure.

7) Comp is typically the favourite theory of the strong materialist (that is those who does not take seriously notion like mind, consciousness, soul etc.). Machine theology is a way to keep the attention of both the materialist computationalist and the people open to both religion and rationality.

8) The machine theology (described at the propositional level by G*) has many things in common with both the pre-christian theology and some Chinese and Indian Metaphysics. I can develop this in due time.

9) Theology is not only the "science of God(s)"; it is the science of the soul, matter, hell, paradise, etc. Theologies were conceived as ... theories of everything, including the mind-body problem which is so often put under the rug by materialist or by people who makes caricature of Aristotle treatment of the question. It is nice that the comp hyp at least forces us to reconsider the question and to accept it is not yet solved.

10) If you let me address development I made since I have defended my thesis, then I have this quite amazing thing. In my thesis both the soul-theory and the matter-theory are obtained from variant of an arithmetical interpretation of the Theaetetical definition of the knower. Soul and matter are really just two different modal variant of arithmetical truth. The soul theory leads to an intuitionistic logic and the matter theory leads to a quantum logic. The recent event is that I have discovered that this arithmetical interpretation extends naturally to the quasi-whole work of Plotinus, including most of the corrections made by his followers (like Proclus for example). This is extraordinary because I have always taken those corrections as attempts to save the naturalist aspect of Aristotle philosophy, and now it looks like the lobian machine is much more Aristotelian than I was expecting. Please take this with some grain of salt, I intend to read more translations of Proclus ... Damascius, before I dare to repeat this publicly, but the fact is that the lobian machine forces me to (re)read theologians. Proclus' treatise is named "theology". Plotinus did influence the Arab, Perse, and Latin worlds notably through an Arab translation of Plotinus (who did wrote his text in Greek) entitled (wrongly) "Theology of Aristotle". Plotinus extracts his theology from (mystical) self-observation translated and largely inspired by Plato's Parmenides. I got that "Arithmetical Plotinus" from the Plato'sTheaetetus. So, it looks like comp and the lobian machine provides a bridge from the Theaetetus to the Parmenides, which is amazing because the Theaetetus is essentially epistemological, and the Parmenides essentially ... theological (if not just pure abstract non sense actually).

Well, I will comment your post tomorrow because duty calls ....
This week and next week I am teaching again so I ask indulgence to the list if I am slow in my comments and if I write too quickly (in between courses) and depart too much from English, if not from sense (!).



Le 06-janv.-06, à 22:15, Benjamin Udell a écrit :

Bruno, list,

The most that I can say about responding so lengthily to Bruno's lengthy response to my lengthy comment, is that I've kept it in one post!

[Ben]>> Bruno, list,
I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand much about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few general remarks. If Bruno is, as he puts it, "[searching for] a general name for a field which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc.," then there are set of Ancient Greek



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