--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit
> > As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a
> machine is.
> Actually I was just saying that no machine can
> *fully* grasp *all
> aspect* of machine. But machines can know what
> machines are. Only, if a
> machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been
> able to prove the
> consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are
> machine (comp) such
> limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of
> including negative one which we can not prove except
> that we can derive
> them from the initial comp act of faith ("yes
> > Bruno: ... and note that the coherence of taking
> > both a and b above is provided by the
> > results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by
> "... no
> > machine can grasp all aspect of machine".
> > So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps
> we end up running
> > away from ill-defined words like "machine",
> "reason", "soul", "faith",
> > etc., for who knows what personal "reasons".
> That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning
> = provability = Bp
> = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931.
> Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p
> = third Plotinus'
> This can look as an oversimplification but the gap
> between truth and
> provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G)
> detrivialises (if I
> can say) all this.
> My fault. I will come back on this.
since when do we think 'beweisbar' (provable) anything
within the domain of our knowledge-base which may have
connotations beyond it (into the unlimited)? Since
when do we want to speak about "Truth" in a general
sense? Our 'truth'? Our percept of reality?
I think "simple definitions" are limiting the validity
of the 'definition' into a narrower model.