--- Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Le 15-févr.-06, à 17:30, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit > : > > > As Bruno said, now we really don't know what a > machine is. > > > Actually I was just saying that no machine can > *fully* grasp *all > aspect* of machine. But machines can know what > machines are. Only, if a > machine M1 is more complex than M2, M2 will not been > able to prove the > consistency of M1, for example. And then if we are > machine (comp) such > limitations apply to us, and this provides lot of > informations, > including negative one which we can not prove except > that we can derive > them from the initial comp act of faith ("yes > doctor"). > > cf: > > Bruno: ... and note that the coherence of taking > simultaneously > > both a and b above is provided by the > incompleteness > > results (Godel, ...) which can be summarized by > "... no > > machine can grasp all aspect of machine". > > > > Tom: > > So in the absense of a precise definition, perhaps > we end up running > > away from ill-defined words like "machine", > "reason", "soul", "faith", > > etc., for who knows what personal "reasons". > > > That is why I propose simple definitions. Reasoning > = provability = Bp > = Beweisbar("p") cf Godel 1931. > Soul = first person = provability-and-truth = Bp & p > = third Plotinus' > hypostase. > This can look as an oversimplification but the gap > between truth and > provability (incarnated in the corona G* minus G) > detrivialises (if I > can say) all this. > > My fault. I will come back on this. > > Bruno > Bruno: since when do we think 'beweisbar' (provable) anything within the domain of our knowledge-base which may have connotations beyond it (into the unlimited)? Since when do we want to speak about "Truth" in a general sense? Our 'truth'? Our percept of reality? I think "simple definitions" are limiting the validity of the 'definition' into a narrower model. John M