>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > Le 01-avr.-06, ࠰0:46, 1Z a 飲it :
>> >
>> > >
>> > >
>> > > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > >
>> > >
>> > >> And read perhaps the literature on the mind
>> body problem: all
>> > >> materialist approaches has failed, and then the
>> result I got  explains
>> > >> what it should be so.
>> > >
>> > > I have my own analysis of  the problem: the
>> words "map" and "territory"
>> > > feature.
>> >
>> >
>> > All right but sometime map are continuously or
>> computationally embedded
>> > in the territory, and so there is a fixed point
>> where the point of the
>> > map coincide with the point of the territory:
>> typically yhe indexical
>> > "where you are", both with respect to the
>> territory and its mapped
>> > representation.
>> That's still isomorphism. What I mean is that there
>> is no
>> problem in the concept that matter can be conscious.
>> The
>> problem is in finding consicousness in 3rd-person
>> descriptions of
>> matter.
> And what, if I may ask, is that "matter" which should
> have "consciousness'?
> Bruno's question of recent "what is physical" has not
> been answered (to my satisfaction at least). Now we
> may add this one to it.
> My 13 year old definition of consciousness (which I do
> not stand by anymore, but did not find a better one)
> "Acknowledgement of and reply to information (= any
> difference accepted by anything) could be applied if
> we had an ID for 'matter' - of which the finest
> ultimate ingredients in the contemporary
> (reductionist) science do not include anything
> matter-like (eg. quarks?) only effects we observe in
> relation with other effects.
> So: WHAT can be conscious?
> John M
> Message truncated
my $0.02
Consciousness = phenomenality.
The derived knowledge acquired through possession of phenomenality can be
infantile (mouse) or genius (Leibniz) (a computational detail). No amount
of abstract computation generates phenomenality.

The problem here is that when the word 'matter' is used it assumes that
the ontology we have for what we call matter completely captures
everything about it.

What about 'vitual matter'? What about if _all_ 'matter interaction' has a
'what it is like' aspect, but that it simply summates to nil everywhere
but in the brain?

On this same assumption, what if matter X acted 'as if' it was being
impacted by matter Y? The phenomenality of Yness may ensue from the
perspective  of being X if it was assymmetric (lossy). This completely
changes the nature of the problem from figuring out the 'stuff' of it to
figuring out the 'visibility' of it. i.e. the difference between what
brain material is doing compared to a rock, say.
> So: WHAT can be conscious?
= anything, if it is organised to have net phenomenality (an entropy
symmetry breaking issue)

The assumption of 'substantialism' is that we tend to think that 'things'
are separate. What if they are not ( at << Planck scales)? What if an atom
is more akin to a flame?


colin hales

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