Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 07-avr.-06, à 17:46, 1Z a écrit :
> > To be precise, there is no problem with a very basic, simple notion of
> > bare substance being the substrate, the bearer, of phenomenal
> > properties as well
> > as physical properties.
> Are you aware of the mind body problem. Are you aware the problem is
> still open.

Yes and yes. I am claiming that the MBP arises from taking mathematical
maps literally
and is therefore greatly exacerbated by adopting a number-only
ontology. Hence
my resitance to a number-only ontology is aprtly motivated by awareness
of the MBP.

> > if you assume comutationalism (as a I undertand it, not as you
> > understand it)
> >  you are already assuming
> > the existence of matter, since computers are material. ...
> You just tell me that you are the one assuming that computers are
> material, so your are begging the question.

Just about everyone assumes computers are material --  it is such a
standard assumption
that most people are not even aware they are making it.

> > The slide from idealism to solipsis is inevitable.
> Pythagoras and Plato already showed counterexamples. If numbers
> generate a "video-game" sort of reality, the game could still a priori
> be sharable, unless you prove the contrary.

yes, it is *possible* for an ideal reality to be shared. But the
idealstic argument
against matter is not that matter is impossible, it is that it is an
unnecessary complication.
But if the posit of external material bodies is unnecessary to explain
experience, so is the posit of external minds, minds other than my own.
I have
no direct access to other minds, I just see their faces and hear their
words, and those can be  reduced to mere sensations as readily as
anything else.
(not that I think the reduction is worthwhile in the first place)

> > If the existence of
> > matter
> > is not needed to explain my experiences, the existence of other
> > experiencers
> > with their own experiences is not neeed to explain my experience
> > either.
> Possible, but not necessary. Other minds appears in comp through the
> notion of first person plural, (arising from the duplication of entire
> population of individuals) and this leads to a notion of "arithmetical
> entanglement".  Actually theory like Shmidhuber or Hal Finney UDIST,
> could probably justify the existence of genuine other minds, and this
> despite they are lacking the 1/3 distinction povs. They suppress
> nevertheless successfully the 3 person white rabbits, and this
> explains, I guess for them, the negligible probability that someone
> behaving like a human is a zombie.
> The 1/3 distinction needs a more detailed treatment and the question is
> obviously still open. Please follow your intuition if you believe you
> could find a contradiction in comp, as I understand it.

Your version of comp seems to be that an abstract algorithm In Plato's
heaven can implement a mind, even though it isn't a process occurring
over a span of time. Admitedly you seem to get there via the idea
that minds can be transferred into processes running on material
computers  (which is what I regard as the standard version of
but you then decide that the matter and the process is redundant --
the pereceived world of a computational mind would appear to be
and temporal. But an computational mind can only have those -- or any
perceptions if it can have consciousness in the first place. If matter
and process are needed to make an algorithm conscious, as the standard
version of computationalims tacitly assumes, they are NOT redundant !

>I mean you
> could be right, but until now, you don't really argue in your posts.
> Bruno

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