Le 15-mai-06, à 02:04, Russell Standish a écrit :

>> I guess it is a delicate point, a key point though, which overlaps the
>> ASSA/RSSA distinction (that is: the Absolute Self Sampling Assumption
>> versus the Relative Self Sampling Assumption).
>> If you identify a "conscious first person history" with a "third 
>> person
>> describable computation", it can be argued that an explanation for
>> physics can be given by Bayesian sort of anthropic reasoning based on
>> some  universal  probability distribution like Hall Finney's
>> Kolmogorovian UDist. Note tat this approach relies also on Church
>> Thesis. Here somehow the TOE will be a winning little program. I agree
>> that this would hunt away the third person white rabbits.
> I disagree. The UDist comes from looking at the measure induced on a
> set of descriptions


> (or computations if your prefer,

It is not the same. It changes the whole problem, especially from the 
Relative SSA (Self-sampling assumption).

> although the two
> are not equivalent),

OK, why not taking that difference into account. I think it is a 
crucial point.

> given a reference Turing machine U. This appears
> to be a 3rd person description, but it need not be so.

I am not sure I understand.

> As I have
> pointed out (but suspect it hasn't really sunk in yet), U can be
> taken to be the observer erself.

I could agree, but U cannot *know* e is U. Need some bet or act of 
In general if U describes the observer, he is a "big" number in need of 
an explanation. I mean, the existence of  "big stable U" is what we try 
to explain.

> When done this way, there is a 1st
> person "universal distribution", with a corresponding 1st person Occam
> razor theorem. And this implies the absence of 1st person white 
> rabbits.

I really don't understand.



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