Le 15-mai-06, à 02:04, Russell Standish a écrit :

>> >> I guess it is a delicate point, a key point though, which overlaps the >> ASSA/RSSA distinction (that is: the Absolute Self Sampling Assumption >> versus the Relative Self Sampling Assumption). >> >> If you identify a "conscious first person history" with a "third >> person >> describable computation", it can be argued that an explanation for >> physics can be given by Bayesian sort of anthropic reasoning based on >> some universal probability distribution like Hall Finney's >> Kolmogorovian UDist. Note tat this approach relies also on Church >> Thesis. Here somehow the TOE will be a winning little program. I agree >> that this would hunt away the third person white rabbits. > > I disagree. The UDist comes from looking at the measure induced on a > set of descriptions OK. > (or computations if your prefer, It is not the same. It changes the whole problem, especially from the Relative SSA (Self-sampling assumption). > although the two > are not equivalent), OK, why not taking that difference into account. I think it is a crucial point. > given a reference Turing machine U. This appears > to be a 3rd person description, but it need not be so. I am not sure I understand. > As I have > pointed out (but suspect it hasn't really sunk in yet), U can be > taken to be the observer erself. I could agree, but U cannot *know* e is U. Need some bet or act of faith. In general if U describes the observer, he is a "big" number in need of an explanation. I mean, the existence of "big stable U" is what we try to explain. > When done this way, there is a 1st > person "universal distribution", with a corresponding 1st person Occam > razor theorem. And this implies the absence of 1st person white > rabbits. I really don't understand. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---