Stephen Paul King wrote: > Dear Quentin et al, > > I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm > itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for > mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation > in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that can > be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. > > AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any > property, including properties that involve some notion of chance.
The existence of some (abstract, theoretical, hypothetical) thing involves all the properties associated (theoretically) with it. The existence of a camel entails the existence if a hump. The existence of a unicorn would entail the existence of a horn. >First of > all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable with, an > object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well. > > http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence > > > Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a predicate > "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the above web > reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of > relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as algorithms and > thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If > Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to > follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no relationship > between entities can obtain. > I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he deals > with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but > nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain > anything that is even close to a notion of implementation. > > also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ > > Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the > properties that are brought into our thinking on this. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms "cast > imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary... > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM > Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA > > > > Hi Hal, > > Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit : > > What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the > > implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person > > using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no way > > in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this > > philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. > > The MWI doesn't change that. > > That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that > physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, there > is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be > instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. > > Quentin Stephen Paul King wrote: > Hi Lee, > > I have no qualms with your point here, but it seems that we have skipped > past the question that I am trying to pose: Where does distinguishability > and individuation follow from the mere existence of Platonic Forms, if > "process" is merely a "relation" between Forms (as Bruno et al claim)?! > > In my previous post I tried to point out that *existence* is not a > first-order (or n-th order) predicate and thus does nothing to distinguish > one Form, Number, Algorithm, or what-have-you from another. Things that physically exist , exist in specific spatio-temporal locations. the fact that something exists in this place rather than that place is indeed a fact over and above the intrinisc properties of the thing. > The property of > individuation requires some manner of distinguishability of one "thing", > "process", etc. from another. Mere existence is insufficient. > We are tacitly assuming an observer or something that amounts to the > same thing any time we assume some 3rd person PoView and such is required > for any coherent notion of distinguishability to obtain and thus something > "to whom" existence means/affects. > > We can go on and on about relations between states, numbers, UDs, or > whatever, but unless we have a consistent way to deal with the source of > individuation and thus distinguishability, we are going nowhere... > > Onward! > > Stephen --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---