Le 07-juil.-06, à 06:45, Lee Corbin a écrit :

> Bruno writes
>> Actually I was about to say that nominal question are suggestive
>> (anybody can answer by principle of a mailing list), and nominal
>> question when thread interferes makes possible to send less
>> mails. But I agree here I miss miserably ...
> Not sure what mistake you think you made  :-)

I see what you mean :)

>   but whatever, it
> could not have been very important.

Well thanks :)

>> I take the opportunity to ask you Lee what is your expectation in 
>> front
>> of the running of a Universal Dovetailer?
> Well, I once got fairly up to speed on the subject of the UD (i.e.,
> I understood it about half as well as you, Hal, Schmidhuber, and
> the rest of the gang here), but it just didn't grab my enthusiasm.

Given that Plato School has been closed for more than 1500 years, and 
that Aristotelian Naturalism is still the common dogma of most 
scientist, I do not expect so much *enthusiasm*.
Just trying to share plausible *understanding*.
As for some practical possible consequences I am not such much 
enthusiast myself, but then I don't put QM in the trash, despite the A 

> So I will take the liberty of imagining a scenario that may have
> a (small) chance of answering your question.

Fair enough.

> I find out that some aliens have set up a colony on the moon.
> Worse, they've subscribed to the everything list, and having
> never had had the notion before on their home planet, are
> designing---AND INTENDING TO CUT LOOSE---a Universal Dovetailer
> made from some weird computronium substance!
> This will either be very good news, or very bad news, because the
> compute speed of their substance is utterly incredible. If they
> turn the damned thing on for even one whole second, it's easy to
> calculate that any given human being will have most of his solar
> system OMs generated by it, all his life on Earth relegated to
> relative insignificance.
> I think that I would be in favor. Because I am having a good life
> (i.e. better than one-percent worth living), and believe than
> human happiness derives mostly from chemicals in the brain
> produced by genetic settings.  So most of the copies of Lee
> Corbin that are generated by the UD should, on the average,
> also have good lives.
> (It's possible that even miserable people reading this can find
> solace in supposing that their genetic setting are not an
> intrinsic part of their identity, and that in most instantiations
> in most universes, their lives are rather good.)
> But alas, that's the limit of my knowledge about the UD.

Given that you told me your lack of enthusiasm for the UD, it will be 
hard for me to give a detailed comment. But don't hesitate to ask me 
any explanation for the following statements:

1) the UD needs to run forever to get any interfering probabilistic 
influence of first person destiny.

(Actually, IF Hal Finney UDIST (universal distribution based on 
Kolmogorov complexity was correct in eliminating both the third person 
rabbits *and* the first person rabbits, a case could be made that a 
sufficiently large portion of the UD's trace would be enough, but this 
needs more work to be make precise ...).

2) You did agree (don't ask me to find the post :) that the proposition 
"W or M" was the correct *first person* bet on the most close immediate 
future personal sensation in the destructive self-duplication 
experiment, where you are destroyed in Brussels and reconstituted in 
both Washington and Moscou (with our without delays ?). W is for "I 
will feel to be in Washington", and W = "I will feel to be in Moscow".
"W or M" is always correct.
"W & M" is always false  (with that protocol).

3) If you get the first sixth step of UDA, which means basically that 
you would understand that the way of quantifying that first person 
indeterminacy cannot depend on the real/virtual/(arithmetical) nature 
of the reconstitution, and, most importantly, that it does not change 
when arbitrary delays of reconstitution are introduced.

4) and the UD is a program which reconstitutes you in your present 
state(s)  (for all your present states, the pasts one, the futures one 
and all the intermediates and parallels) through all computational 
histories. You met *the* comp first person indeterminacy. To predict 
exactly the observable trajectory of the observed (as well as possible) 
moon, you need ... some first person (plural) computation statistic. If 
grandmother's physics or quantum field theory gives correct approximate 
results, it means both should emerge from that 1-computation statistic.

> And my eyes glaze over every time I come to extended discussions
> about "1st person", considering as I do those to be a linguistic
> mistake/death-spiral almost as bad as discussions about qualia.

I guess the trouble is exactly there. Thanks for your frankness. But 
note that in the UDA reasoning (like in Everett QM) we use a rather 
simple third person approximation of the first person: it is just their 
personal memory sequences, like "WWWMWMMMWMMWW".

Things are becoming just much more precise in the interview of the 
self-introspecting universal (lobian) machine, where the first person 
(the soul) is *then* defined by the knowing subject, and for this one I 
take Theaetetus' definition (like Plotinus, cf Bréhier).



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