Bruno Marchal wrote:

> >> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
> >> truth.
> >
> > No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
> > found in maths than any substantiallity.
> But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics,

Then we need something ontologically richer than physics
to explain experience, not something onotologically
stripped-down (physics without substance).

> nor
> really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings.

Substance is mass-energy, and it still exists
as such in current physics.

>  But
> nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy.

Huh ? They have non-zero mass-energy. That's all
physicists need. Was that a solipsist's "proved" ?

> In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and
> eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see
> a needle on some apparatus.

Looks like it was

IOW, having assumed solipsism, you can find no way out of it.

Well, you can: you can assume the Platonic existence of numbers,
even though numbers as such don't feature in your experience.

But if you are entitled to do that to find a way out
of solipsism, the materialist is entitled to assume matter.

(Or even posit substance as necessary to explain the phenomenal flow
of time, as Kant did).

> You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just
> related with stuffy things.

Some kinds of non-mathematical stuff are needed to resolve
the HP problem, to explain time, to explain phenomenality
and so on. The point is to posit enough to explain the universe
as we experience it and then stop.

>  How and why? Many philosophers of mind
> agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized.

I'm not one of them.

>  A pain is
> already immaterial,

There is no basis for saying that whatosever.
Only living organisms feel pains, and organisms
are material.

> and that is why so many accept the comp hyp
> (perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to
> explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial)
> from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers)
> than on something material.

So can you give the mathematical formula for the colour
purple, or the taste of honey ? Of course not!

The mind-body problem boils down to reconciling phenomenality with
mathematical* descriptions, not with matter pre se!

Consciousness is a problem for all forms of materialism and physicalism
to some extent, but it is possible to discern where the problem is
particularly acute. There is no great problem with the idea that matter
considered as a bare substrate can have mental properities. Any
inability to have mental proeprties would itslef be a property and
therefore be inconsistent with the bareness of a bare substrate. The
"subjectity" of consciouss states, often treated as "inherent" boils
down to a problem of communicating one's qualia -- how one feesl, how
things seem. Thus it is not truly inherent but depends on the means of
communication being used. Feelings and seemings can be more readily
communicated in artistic, poetice language, and least readily in
scientifi technical language. Since the harder, more technical a
science is, the more mathematical it is, the communication problem is
at its most acute in a purely mathematical langauge. Thus the problem
with physicalism is not its posit of matter (as a bare substrate) but
its other posit, that all properties are phycial. Since physics is
mathematical, that amounts to the claim that all properties are
mathematical (or at least mathematically describable). In making the
transition from a physicalist world-view to a mathematical one, the
concept of a material substrate is abandoned (although it was never a
problem for consciousness) and the posit of mathematical properties
becomes, which is a problem for consciousness becomes extreme.

>  Especially when we don't know what
> "material" really means.

It means the substrate of properties, contingent existence, endurance
through time, and hence real change, unactualised potential and causal

> I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is
> not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp
> frame. Then I got partial solutions.
> Bruno

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to