Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to > start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. > Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the > implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to > make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of > physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet > be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical > processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere > existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail > giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations > contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's > suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this > preserves computationalism either. > > Stathis Papaioannou
There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do not require a physical basis" and "computations do not require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
