Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to
> start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors.
> Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the
> implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to
> make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of
> physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet
> be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical
> processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere
> existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail
> giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations
> contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's
> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this
> preserves computationalism either.
> Stathis Papaioannou
There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
implemented by a wide variety of systems)
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