Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to 
> start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. 
> Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the 
> implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to 
> make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of 
> physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet 
> be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical 
> processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere 
> existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail 
> giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations 
> contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's 
> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this 
> preserves computationalism either.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou

There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do
not require a physical basis" and "computations do not
require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be
physical
implemented by a wide variety of systems)


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to