Le 06-août-06, à 15:59, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> > Russell Standish writes: > >> This is one of those truly cracked ideas that is not wise to air in >> polite company. Nevertheless, it can be fun to play around with in >> this forum. I had a similarly cracked idea a few years ago about 1st >> person experienced magic, which we batted around a bit at the tiome >> without getting anywhere. >> >> The trouble I have with this idea is that I can't see the connection >> between OM measure and the sensation of passage of time. In contrast >> to your statement of "nothing" however, a lower measure OM will appear >> more complex - so we experience growth in knowledge as our measure >> decreases. Increasing measure OM's will correspond to memory >> "erasure", in the sense of quantum erasure. > > My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running > in parallel, > you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given > objective time > period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as > long. I certainly doubt that! > There > is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why > it's a cracked > idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the > only half-plausible > subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone. The (relative) number or proportion of emulation will never change a content of an experience, but could change the relative probabilities, both in comp and in QM. > > I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will > appear > more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a > controlled > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving > everything else > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect > lockstep. I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney, Mallah, etc.). OK? > > (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, > which would > not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything > if half the > computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be > impossible for the AI > to notice that anything had changed without receiving external > information. I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some "Bell inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows indirectly the presence of some alternate computations. > If I > were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple > computers running > is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't > care if there > were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel. Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your "normal" measure. Bruno > > Stathis Papaioannou > >> On Sat, Aug 05, 2006 at 10:44:49PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>> >>> I have asked the question before, what do I experience if my measure >>> in the multiverse increases or decreases? My preferred answer, contra >>> the ASSA/ QTI skeptics, is "nothing". However, the interesting >>> observation >>> that our perception of time changes with age, so that an hour seems >>> subjectively much longer for a young child than for an older person, >>> would >>> seem to correlate with decreasing measure as a person grows older. >>> One >>> explanation for this could be that if there are more copies of us >>> around >>> in the multiverse, we have more subjective experience per unit time. >>> This >>> would mean that if we lived forever, the years then the centuries >>> and millenia >>> would fly past at a subjectively faster and faster rate as we age >>> and our >>> measure continuously drops. >>> >>> I actually believe that a psychological explanation for this >>> phenomenon is more >>> likely correct (an hour is a greater proportion of your life if you >>> are a young child) >>> but it's an interesting idea. >>> >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >>> ---------------------------------------- >>>> Date: Fri, 4 Aug 2006 02:10:53 +1000 >>>> From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>>> To: [email protected] >>>> Subject: Re: Interested in thoughts on this excerpt from Martin Rees >>>> >>>> >>>> Someone called me to task for this posting (I forget who, and I've >>>> lost the posting now). I tried to formulate the notion I expressed >>>> here more precisely, and failed! So I never responded. >>>> >>>> What I had in mind was that future observer moment of my current one >>>> will at some point have a total measure diminishing at least as fast >>>> as an exponental function of OM age. This is simply a statement that >>>> it becomes increasingly improbable for humans to live longer than a >>>> certain age. >>>> >>>> Whilst individual OMs will have exponentially decreasing measure due >>>> to the linear increase in complexity as a function of universe age, >>>> total OM measure requires summing over all OMs of a given age (which >>>> can compensate). This total OM measure is a 3rd person type of >>>> quantity - equivalent to asking what is the probability of a >>>> conscious >>>> organism existing at universe age t. It seems plausible that this >>>> might diminish in some exponential or faster fashion after a few >>>> standard deviation beyond the mean time it takes to evolve >>>> consciousness, but I do not have any basis for making this claim. If >>>> we assume a normal distribution of times required for evolving >>>> consciousness, then the statement is true for example, but I'm wise >>>> enough to know that this assumption needs further justification. The >>>> distribution may be a meanless thing like a power law for example. >>>> >>>> So sorry if I piqued someones interest too much - but then we can >>>> leave >>>> this notion as a conjecture :) >>>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> On Fri, Jul 28, 2006 at 12:07:37AM +1000, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>> Thanks for giving a digested explanation of the argument. This >>>>> paper >>>>> was discussed briefly on A-Void a few weeks ago, but I must admit >>>>> to >>>>> not following the argument too well, nor RTFA. >>>>> >>>>> My comment on the observer moment issue, is that in a Multiverse, >>>>> the >>>>> measure of older observer moments is less that younger ones. After >>>>> a >>>>> certain point in time, the measure probably decreases >>>>> exponentially or >>>>> faster, so there will be a mean observer moment age. >>>>> >>>>> So contra all these old OMs dominating the calculation, and giving >>>>> rise to an expected value of Lambda close to zero, we should expect >>>>> only a finite contribution, leading to an expected finite value of >>>>> Lambda. >>>>> >>>>> We don't know what the mean age for an observer moment should be, >>>>> but >>>>> presumably one could argue anthropically that is around 10^{10} >>>>> years. What does this give for an expected value of Lambda? >>>>> >>>>> Of course their argument does sound plausible for a single >>>>> universe - >>>>> is this observational evidence in favour of a Multiverse? > > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314 > -9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
