Russell Standish:

> On Sun, Aug 06, 2006 at 11:59:42PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > My thought was that if there are twice as many copies of you running in 
> > parallel, 
> > you are in a sense cramming twice as much experience into a given objective 
> > time 
> > period, so maybe this "stretches out" the time period to seem twice as 
> > long. There 
> > is admittedly no good reason to accept that this is so (that's why it's a 
> > cracked 
> > idea, as you say!), and I would bet that it *isn't* so, but it's the only 
> > half-plausible 
> > subjective effect I can think of due to change in measure alone.
> > 
> > I believe that what you mean when you say that a lower measure OM will 
> > appear 
> > more complex is somewhat different to the scenario I had in mind: a 
> > controlled 
> > experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving everything 
> > else 
> > the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in perfect 
> > lockstep. 
> > (I realise this is not the same as changing measure in the multiverse, 
> > which would 
> > not lend itself so easily to experiment.) Would the AI notice anything if 
> > half the 
> > computers were turned off then on again? I think it would be impossible for 
> > the AI 
> > to notice that anything had changed without receiving external information. 
> > If I 
> > were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple computers 
> > running 
> > is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I wouldn't care 
> > if there 
> > were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
> > 
> > Stathis Papaioannou 
> This thought experiment has been discussed a few times in this
> list. I agree with you that one wouldn't expect there to be any
> difference in subjective experience, but more than that wrt Bruno's
> work, assuming COMP  (which you have to anyway to consider the thought
> experiment), there is actually no way to change the measure of a
> particular computation - computations exist in Platonia wuth
> presumably some measure (measure is fixed in my approach by the
> actions of the observer, but others do not necessarily have an answer
> to what the measure is). That is why Bruno can eliminate the concrete
> universe hypothesis altogether.

Is it still correct to say that a computation running on two physical computers 
(that is, what 
we think of as physical computers, whatever the underlying reality may be) has 
almost twice 
the measure as it would have if it were running on one computer? Otherwise, 
there would 
be no point backing up anything, relying instead on Platonia's infinite hard 

Stathis Papaioannou
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