Bruno Marchal wrote:

> FP2: I do periphrases to talk about it. It is a confusing notion (cf
> Chalmers "delusion"). Mathematically it needs bimodal logics (or just G
> handled with care);


Thanks for the summary, I'll look out for the roadmap.  I'd just like
to clarify the role of FP2 above:

Where FP1i is an individual first-person-as-instantiated, FP2 is its
analog in what I've termed the 'shareable knowledge base' (SKB) that is
part of the structure of FP1i.  The reason I make this distinction is
that when I make some unqualified reference simply to 'Bruno', it is
not thereby clear whether this is meant to indicate 'FP2 Bruno' - i.e
the representation you or I have of 'Bruno' in the SKB - or 'FP1
Bruno', the unique entity to which my FP2 analog refers.  In
inter-personal dialogue, this can become really confusing because one
party may be conceptualising in an FP2-manner - i.e. thinking in a
'naturalistic' way purely in terms of the FP2 representation of the
world and its embedded FP2 representations of first persons - when the
other (usually me, I must confess) is thinking in an FP1-manner - i.e.
extrapolating from the FP2 representations to their FP1 referents. Such
confusion may be implicated in 'Chalmers' delusion' and other puzzles.
I say something about this in my comments on your earlier posts.

To be consistent, what I'm calling FP2 should be split along the lines
of FP1 into:

FP2g - representations in the SKB of FP1g
FP2i - representations in the SKB of FP1i

Does the above clarification make a difference?


> Le 07-août-06, à 22:12, David Nyman a écrit :
> > 1) FP1g - primitive 'global' first person entity or context
> > 2) FP1i - individual person delimited by primitive differentiation
> > (which is agnostic to comp, physics, or anything else at this logical
> > level)
> > 3) FP2 - narrative references to first persons, as in 'David is a first
> > person', an attribution, as opposed to 'David-as-first-person', a
> > unique entity.
> > 4) TP - third person, or structure-read-as-information, as opposed to
> > structure-demarcating-an-entity
> OK, I copy this in some file so as to be able to come back on it later.
>   If I comment it here, before the "roadmap-summary",  it will be
> confusing. Still, before I send the "roadmap" I give the correspondence
> for those who have followed your posts and remember my earlier
> summaries.
> FP1g will most probably correspond to the "time/knowledge" modal logic
> S4Grz;
> FP1i will not be explicitly treated, but can correspond to any
> particular relative implementation of a self-referentially correct
> machine. Then S4Grz will still work, but its arithmetical
> interpretations can vary;
> FP2: I do periphrases to talk about it. It is a confusing notion (cf
> Chalmers "delusion"). Mathematically it needs bimodal logics (or just G
> handled with care);
> TP:  will correspond to the G and G* logic of arithmetical reference,
> including self-reference. Of course the dissociation of the
> corresponding logics into G and G* (and the non-dissociation of the 1
> person logic S4Grz = S4Grz*, is a key phenomenon which is forced by the
> incompleteness phenomenon. G corresponds to the provable
> self-referential statements and G* will correspond to the true
> self-referential statements. That the set of true statements minus the
> set of provable statements (that is G* \ G) is not empty is due to
> Godel incompleteness.
> But there are other hypostases (person pov): the 0-person pov (More or
> less Nagel's pov from nowhere) which can be  just "arithmetical truth"
> with the comp. hyp. It plays the role of the neoplatonist "ONE" in the
> arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus's hypostases.
> Then there is the "matter" or "1-plural-pov" where "matter" becomes
> apparent ...
> I will try to present a roadmap tomorrow or the day after. In the
> meantime you could consult my SANE paper:
> SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
> You can also download the UDA slides for reference to its 8 steps
> presentation.
> Bruno

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