George Levy wrote (to Brent Meeker):

Brent: As I understand him, Bruno agrees with Russell that "I" is a construct or
George: I think you are right. Bruno is not as extreme as I am but I am not sure exactly where he stands. He may be non-committed or he may not know how to reconcile my viewpoint with his math. It would be nice if we could reconcile the two viewpoints!!!

My problem is that it seems to me that I can reconcile your viewpoint (and David Nyman's one, and even Colin Hales I would say) but only with a big price, which is that eventually there are only numbers. Then everything you say fits nicely the discourse of the 1-person attached canonically to the (lobian) machine/number: she herself believe that everything stems from her 1-point of view, until she is open to bet on the independent existence of some others, and then to the independence of numbers.

That's why there can be 1st-person indeterminancy.

No. This is not why. In fact, first person indeterminacy probably reinforces my point. First person indeterminacy comes about because there are several links from one observer moment (could be called "I" state) to the next logical (or historically consistent) logical moment. As you can see everything hinges on the "I" states. You can view I states either as nodes or as branches depending how you define the network. Of course those logical links are emergent as figment of imagination of the "I" in an anthropy kind of way.

All right. Except that "anthropos" means "human", and the "I" I am using is Turing-Lob tropic or number-tropic instead.

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