Le 14-août-06, à 01:04, David Nyman a écrit :
> There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my > most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take > seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it > seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally', > or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction > therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield: > > 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') > 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of > observer situations > 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between > 'figure' and 'ground') > 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer > situations > > Any views on this? 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names emerges through the third person pint of view. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
