Le 14-août-06, à 01:04, David Nyman a écrit :

> There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my
> most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take
> seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it
> seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally',
> or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction
> therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield:
> 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation')
> 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of
> observer situations
> 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between
> 'figure' and 'ground')
> 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer
> situations
> Any views on this?

1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the 
zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names 
emerges through the third person pint of view.



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