Bruno Marchal wrote: > 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the > zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names > emerges through the third person pint of view.
I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality' of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary reality. Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such necessity through logical force majeure? Yours in ontic realism David > Le 14-août-06, à 01:04, David Nyman a écrit : > > > There is another aspect, which I've been musing about again since my > > most recent exchanges with Peter. This is that if one is to take > > seriously (and I do) 'structural' or 'block' views such as MWI, it > > seems to me that whatever is behaving 'perceivingly', '1st-personally', > > or 'subjectly' (gawd!) is the gestalt, not any particular abstraction > > therefrom. It seems to me that this is necessary to yield: > > > > 1) The unnameability of the 1st-person (i.e. 'this observer situation') > > 2) The consequential validity (?) of any probability calculus of > > observer situations > > 3) The dynamic quality of time as experienced (i.e. contrast between > > 'figure' and 'ground') > > 4) Meta-experiential layering - e.g. 'coherent histories' of observer > > situations > > > > Any views on this? > > 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the > zero-person "point of view" will appear also to be unnameable. Names > emerges through the third person pint of view. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---