Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):

> > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
> 
> I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> if-then statements.
> 
> > other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing
> > any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case,
> > Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to
> > a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is
> > conscious and the other not.
> 
> If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
> identical.

What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a 
recording. 
Would that count as a program at all, and could it be a conscious program, 
given that 
computationalism is true?

Stathis Papaioannou
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