Peter Jones writes (quoting SP):
> > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system
> > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur,
>
> I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain
> if-then statements.
>
> > other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing
> > any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case,
> > Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to
> > a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is
> > conscious and the other not.
>
> If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically
> identical.
What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a
recording.
Would that count as a program at all, and could it be a conscious program,
given that
computationalism is true?
Stathis Papaioannou
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