Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote:

>> The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I 
>> don't
>> think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is.

I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of "internal"  or 
epistemological existence, build from the simplest conceptual third 
person ontological commitments.
Comp necessitates the numbers for the "ontic" part, and the rest 
emerges as coherent overlapping set of of computations (quotientized 
through some undistinguishability first person equivalence relation).
To be short.



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