David Nyman wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Hmm. I think the substrate is just down to Somethingism -- some
> > possible things
> > exist, other don't.
> Yes, but I find that to avoid slipping implicitly into 'relations
> without the relata', or necessarily relying on 'matter', it's
> conceptually helpful to have a 'figure/ ground' sort of schema, and the
> 'ground' is what I'm here calling the 'substrate'. Within this, some
> 'things' - occasions of relatedness - will exist, others won't.
> >
> > So: even if I don't know in which sense i exsit, I exist
> > in some sense S, and if numbers don't exist in (at least)
> > sense S (whatever that is) , I cannot be one.
> >
> > Therefore, there must be some kind of existence-claim
> > in Bruno's thesis.
> Yes, sorry - language again. I meant 'reflexive' precisely in the sense
> that S must be the same for both - i.e. the senses must 'reflect' each
> other even where they're not specified in detail. So of course I agree
> that Bruno's view implies an existence claim (though I know he
> doesn't).
> > I am not at all sure that "views" equate to kinds of existstence.
> >
> > I just think that arguments cannot come to sound existential
> > conclusions
> > without making existential assumptions..
> OK. And the sound existential conclusion, and the assumptions on which
> it is based, will must be adequate to account for both of these views,
> yes?
> > The bare substrate, AFAICS, is inferred empricially,
> > although having been inferred, it can then explain various
> > basic facts logically (through its very bareness!)
> When you say 'empirically' do you mean for example that there might
> have been no opportunity for us to infer anything, or that something
> quite other might have been the case to be inferred?

I mean that historically the concept of matter emerged
from observation. There are various things that can be
made out of the raw-material of wood, various that can be made out of
maybe there is a sub-raw-material that underpins wood and stone.

"Taking the term in its widest sense, matter signifies that out of
which anything is made or composed. Thus the original meaning of hyle
(Homer) is "wood", in the sense of "grove" or "forest"; and hence,
derivatively, "wood cut down" or timber. The Latin materia, as opposed
to lignum (wood used for fuel), has also the meaning of timber for
building purposes. In modern languages this word (as signifying raw
material) is used in a similar way. Matter is thus one of the elements
of the becoming and continued being of an artificial product. The
architect employs timber in the building of his house; the shoemaker
fashions his shoes from leather. It will be observed that, as an
intrinsic element, matter connotes composition, and is most easily
studied in a consideration of the nature of change."


. I suppose when you
> appeal to 'brute facts', that necessarily implies that the facts might
> be brutally otherwise. But do you hold that there are any logically or
> conceptually prior constraints on what could be available to be brutely
> discovered, or is this simply an open question?

Well, I don't think logical contradicitons are possible...beyond
that the only constraint is the weak anthropic principle.

> > I am not convinced that ther is anything special about
> > my existence objectively, it is just a convenient starting-point
> > (epistemologcially).
> > It might turn out to be inessential (ontologically).
> Well, your factual existence may be circumstantially contingent,
> although necessarily potential in the overall state of affairs, given
> your factual existence. So, 'inessential' in what sense?

In that sense: "my factual existence may be circumstantially

> > I don't think Bruno and Stathis are arguing that numbers are
> > neceesarily
> > the only things that exist (although a standard Platonist might argue
> > that
> > that they are the only things that exist necessarily..)
> But aren't they claiming that numbers are the only things necessary
> (together with the operations required for CT+YD, whatever they might
> be) to account for *our* existence? If not, what else is required?

Standard Platonists (e.g Plato) don't claim that.

> > The point of that particular formulation is to avoid giving an exact
> > meaning --
> > although I the meaning of existence in the
> > emprical-contingent-materialist
> > snese can be explained.
> So in that case is empirical evidence to convince us one way or the
> other only to the extent that we are willing to build 'empiricism' into
> our presuppositions about reality? IOW, are all justifications destined
> to be entirely circular?

Empiricism vs. rationalism is the really deep question here.

If Everythingism is the combination of rationalsim (all truths are
necessary apriori truths) and Mathematical Monism (mathematical objects
exist, and are
all that exist), it may be self-defeating , in that the second claim,
ie Mathematical Monism, is not a necessary truth.

If that is the case, empiricism-contingency-materialism (AKA
wins by default.

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