Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 21-août-06, à 16:23, 1Z a écrit :
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> Le 21-août-06, à 13:34, 1Z a écrit :
> >>> If Plato's heaven doesn't exist, I can't be in it.
> >> I can hardly not agree with that.
> >>> If numbers do not explain my existence -- explaining
> >>> how a strucuture like a physial world would emerge from
> >>> a UD if a UD existed does not explain my *existence* --
> >>> then something else does, such as matter.
> >> 1) I don't think think so at all. Even if numbers cannot explain your
> >> existence, it does not follows that matter can explain it, nor God,
> >> nor
> >> anything else a priori.
> > Matter has been a succesful explanation for many centuries -- an
> > aposteriori explanation. Who said that only apriori explanations are
> > acceptable ?
> > Is that the premiss underlying your other premisses ?
> I talk about primitive or primary matter. Just show me one text where
> that notion explain anything.
Matter is a bare substrate with no properties of its own. The question
may well be asked at this point: what roles does it perform ? Why not
dispense with matter and just have bundles of properties -- what does
matter add to a merely abstract set of properties? The answer is that
not all bundles of posible properties are instantiated, that they
What does it mean to say something exists ? "..exists" is a meaningful
predicate of concepts rather than things. The thing must exist in some
sense to be talked about. But if it existed full, a statement like
"Nessie doesn't exist" would be a contradiction ...it would amout to
"the existing thign Nessie doesnt exist". However, if we take that the
"some sense" in which the subject of an "...exists" predicate exists is
only initially as a concept, we can then say whether or not the concept
has something to refer to. Thus "Bigfoot exists" would mean "the
concept 'Bigfoot' has a referent".
What matter adds to a bundle of properties is existence. A non-existent
bundle of properties is a mere concept, a mere possibility. Thus the
concept of matter is very much tied to the idea of contingency or
"somethingism" -- the idea that only certain possible things exist.
The other issue matter is able to explain as a result of having no
properties of its own is the issue of change and time. For change to be
distinguishable from mere succession, it must be change in something.
It could be a contingent natural law that certain properties never
change. However, with a propertiless substrate, it becomes a logical
necessity that the substrate endures through change; since all changes
are changes in properties, a propertiless substrate cannot itself
change and must endure through change
> I have never find a physical theory using it, except that it is
> implicitly assume in the background, but the notion are never referred
All physics assumes "Somethingism" -- it seeks to find the one
mathemticals structure, out of all the structures "in Platonia"
that describes the universe. Since i define matter in a somethingist
way, that means all physics is materialist.
> > It can also provide support for time and qulia, and
> > explain away HP universes.
> All serious people in the philosophy of mind agree that the mind-body
> problem is not yet solved.
There is difference between providing an explanation, making
and explanation possible, and making an explanation impossible.
Matterialism per se does not provide a solution to the MBP.
Matter makes certain classes of solution possible-- e.g. property
Immaterialism makes the MBP harder or impossible.
> Even Dennett agrees on this in the last
> chapter of his "consciousness explained". Matter makes things worst
> because, at least with comp, we have to justify it without positing it.
Computationalism alone does not justify the existnce
of an entity capable of being appeared-to; so by itself
it does not allow matter to be explained away as an appearance.
> > Everett is compatible with standard computationalism.
> > It doesn't have to assume computationalism. Any non-magical
> > theory of mind will do.
> Well, actually I do agree a bit with you here. But comp is assumed by
> almost all many-worlder. This is because comp is the only known theory
> of mind which does not posit actual infinities,
Not at all. The uncomputability of matter, qualia
or anything else does not have to be justified in mathematical
terms by their being actual infinities. It can be justified
by their being fundamentally un-mathematical. For the
non-Platonist, it is a peculiarty of abstract mathematical
structures and behaviour that they can be emulated without deficit.
Non-emulability, by contrast , is just business as usual.
. and in general people
> attracted to MW are motivated by searching a theory compatatible with
> reasonable approach to the mind.
> > Not just computationalism, because you need to
> > assume a UD exists
> No. The UD exists by AR, without which CT would not make sense.
AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD.
AR as a claim about existence is
enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
of the UD, but is not impied by computationalism.
> I recall that by "the UD exists", I mean just that the truth of some
> existential proposition in number theory is independent of me.
> I'm afraid you are defending a (widespread) aristotelian misconception
> of Platonia, like if it was some magical realm in which the numbers
> exists, when I just mean the usual meaning of existence of numbers. Yes
> the usual meaning is platonist. Mathematicians are almost all platonist
> about natural numbers, even the week-end.
> I think that if you study the UDA, it will be easier for you to
> interpret the terms by the use I make of them.
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