Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Peter Jones writes:
>>>> That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
>>>> have to believe any old programme is conscious.
>>>> It might be the case that only an indeterministic
>>>> one will do. A deterministic programme could
>>>> be exposed as a programme in a Turing Test.
>>> Then you're saying something strange and non-physical happens to
>>> why a program is conscious on the first run when it passes the
>>> Turing test
>>> but not on the second run when it deterministically repeats all the
>>> physical states
>>> of the first run in response to a recording of your keystrokes from
>>> the first run.
>> It was never conscious, and if anyonw concludede it was on
>> the first run, they were mistaken. The TT is a rule-of-thumb for
>> it does not magically endow consciousness.
> Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
> true random
> number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only
> the former
> could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no
> reason to believe
> that it is true.
It *has* been proved (by diagonalization) that there exist some problem
in number theory which are soluble by a machine using a random oracle,
although no machine with pseudorandom oracle can sole the problem.
KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and
Control, 57, pp. 40-47.
But it is not relevant given that self-duplication is already a way to
emulate true random oracle.
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