Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
> > Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
> It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
> explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate",

I don't see why.

>  an then attach your
> mind to it (how?).

Why not ? A bare substrate can carry any property whatsoever.
Just because it isn't a logically necessary truth doens't make
it impossible.

> >  If it
> > were impossible to attach a class of properties to a substrate,
> > that would constitute a property of the substrate, and so it would not
> > be bare
> I am sorry but you lost me here. Especially when elsewhere you say the
> bare substrate can have subjective experiences.

Think of a bare substrate as a blank sheet of paper.
You can writhe anything on it, but what is written
on it is no part of the paper itself.

A bare substrate can carry any properties, but it is bare
in itself.

> > Bare substrate is compatible with qualia.
> How?

There is nothing to stop it being compatible with qualia.

> > Nothing-but-numbers is not.
> Why?

Becuase you would have to identify qualia with mathematical
structures, which no-one can do.

> > If Platonia is not real in any sense, it cannot
> > contain observers, persons, appearances, etc.
> >
> >>> To exist Platonically is to exist eternally and necessarily. There is
> >>> no time or changein Plato's heave.
> >>
> >>
> >> All partial recursive solutions of Schroedinger or Dirac equation
> >> exists in Platonia, and define through that "block description" notion
> >> of internal time quite analogous to Everett subjective probabilities.
> >
> > The A-series cannot be reduced to the B-series.
> All the point is that with Church thesis you can do that.

How ?

> >>> A program is basically the same as a number.
> >>
> >> No it isn't. You don't know which programme is specified
> >> by a number without knowing how the number is to
> >> be interpreted, ie what hardware it is running on.
> Not necessarily. The numbers can be interpreted by other numbers. The
> closure of the Fi for diagonalization makes this possible. No need for
> more than numbers and their additive and multiplicative behavior. I
> don't pretend this is obvious.
> >
> >>
> >>> A process or a computation
> >>> is a finite or infinite sequence of numbers (possibly branching, and
> >>> defined relatively to a universal numbers).
> >>
> >> It is not just a sequence, because a sequence
> >> does not specify counterfactuals.
> That is why I said "possibly branching".

Branching is not COUNTERfactual either -- the other branches
are as real as "this" one.

> >> The UD build all such (branching) sequences.
> >
> > If it exists.
> >>
> >> That way, except I say this from the comp assumption, unlike Deutsch
> >> who says this from the quantum assumption. (of course "real" means
> >> here
> >> generated by the UD)
> >
> > If it exists.
> Even Robinson Arithmetic "believes" in the UD.

No purely mathematical theory makes an onotological commitment.
Formalists can do Robinson Arithemetic too.

>  The UD exists like the
> square root of two, or any recursively enumerable set.

ie not at all , as far as formalists are concerned.

You do not get ontology for free with maths. It has to be
argued separately.

> You exist in a sense related to that existence but not necessarily
> identical.

If the square root of two does not exist at all,
I do not exist in relation to it.

>  It depends also if by "I" you mean such or such n-person
> view of "I". But I give all the precise definitions elsewhere.

> > Because in a mathematics-only universe, qualia have to be identified
> > with, or reduced to, mathematical structures.
> Certainly. They are given by the intensional variant of G* \minus G.
> See my SANE paper.

So what is the formula for the taste of lemon ?

> > If your Platonia is restricted to arithmetic, that would be
> > a contingent fact.
> I just need people believe that what they learn at school in math
> remains true even if they forget it.

Truth is not existence.

> I use the poetical term "platonia" mainly when I use freely the
> excluded middle, and put no bound on the length of the computations. In
> the lobian interview, "the belief in platonia" is defined by (A v ~A).

That formula is about truth, not existence.

> You can take it formally or just accept that closed first order
> sentences build with the symbols {S, +, *, 0} are either true or false.
> You need this just for using the term "conjecture" in number theory.

> Don't put more in "platonia" than we need it in the reasoning and in
> the working with the theory. When I say that a number exists, I say it
> in the usual sense of the mathematicians. My ontology is what Brouwer
> called the separable part of mathematics: it is the domain where all
> mathematicians agree, except the ultra-intuitionist (a microscopic
> non-comp minority).

There is no domain about which all mathematicians agree ontologically.
Platonists think it all exists, intuitionists think some of it exists,
formalists think none of it exists.

There is a large are over which they agree epistemologically.
and Platonists can accept the same axioms and conclusons. Only
inutitionists rejet some of the formalism that others accept.
> Bruno

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