1Z wrote: > Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on > the *existence* of an instance of it ?
What I mean is that - for a 'thoroughgoing contingentist' - 'statements', 'concepts', 'truths', 'referents' and anything else whatsoever can exist solely in virtue of their actual contingent instantiation (i.e. there literally isn't any other sort of 'existence'). Within such a world-view, even apparently inescapable logical truths are 'necessary' only within a relational system instantiated solely in terms of a contingent world. They cannot 'transcend' present contingencies, and under different contingencies (about which we can know nothing) they could be different. This establishes an 'epistemic horizon' for a contingent world. > What does instantiation have to do with truth ? Everything. 'Truth' in contingent terms is (very loosely) something like: 1) dispositions to believe that certain statements correspond with putative sets of 'facts'. 2) sets of 'facts' 3) logical/ empirical processes of judgement 4) conclusions as to truths asserted 5) behaviour consequent on this 6) etc. If any element of this - from soup to nuts - fails to be instantiated in some form it cannot exist in a purely contingent world. In this view, 'conceptual existence' is just the instantiated existence of a concept. AFAICS any other view would have to assert some sort of transcendent 'conceptual existence' that subsumes 'contingent existence'. > Logical possibility is defined in terms of contradiciton. > Why should it turn out to be nonetheless dependent > on instantiation ? Because 'contradiction' itself depends on instantiation. A statement is 'contradictory' because its referent is impossible to instantiate under present contingencies. In this world-view, answering such questions is easy - *everything* depends on such instantiation. Conceptual 'existence' is simply the sum of the instantiations of all (agreed) instances of a concept - IOW they're all apples if we agree they are. Any other view is surely already 'Platonic'? > I don't see why. You just seem to be treating > truth and existence as interchangeable, which > begs the questions AFAICS. No, I'm saying (above) that 'truth' in a contingent world can only be *derived* from present contingencies. By this token, truth in any 'transcendent' sense is either impossible (if one believes in a contingent world), or alternatively *must* be a de facto 'existence' claim that rules out 'primary contingency' - i.e. the world 'in the sense that I exist' is supposed to emerge from 'necessity'. So I'm agreeing with you (I think) in your contention that 'number theology', to be ontically coherent, must be an existence claim for a priori truth in this 'strong' sense. > > To be coherent AFAICS one would need to be making > > ontic claims for 'necessary truth' that would constrain 'contingent > > possibility'. > > I have no idea what you mean by that. Why would a claim about > necessary truth be ontic rather than epistemic, for instance ? For the reasons you yourself have argued - i.e. that claims based on 'Platonic numbers' must be regarded as ontic in a strong sense if they are supposed to account for a world that exists 'in the sense that I exist'. Epistemic claims would then follow from this. David > David Nyman wrote: > > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > Statements, concepts and beliefs must > > > be contingently instantiated. That doesn't > > > mean that their truths-values are logially > > > contingent. > > > > > > > I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can > > establish a 'logical necessity' that is independent of 'contingent > > instantiation' > > Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on > the *existence* of an instance of it ? > > Moreover, the necessary truth of mathematical statements > follows from their lack or real referents:- > > > Mathematical statements > are necessarily true because there are no possible circumstances > that make them false; there are no possible circumstances that > would make them false because they do not refer to anything > external. This is much simpler than the Platonist > alternative that mathematical statements: > > 1) have referents > which are > 2) unchanging and eternal, unlike anything anyone has actually seen > and thereby > 3) explain the necessity (invariance) of mathematical statements > without > 4) performing any other role -- they are not involved in > mathematical proof. > > > > and thus escapes restriction to 'necessary under certain > > contingencies' (even if these are equivalent to 'any that I can > > imagine'). > > > > If one is going to be a 'contingentist', then one might as > > well be a thoroughgoing one. > > > > > But physical possibility is a subset > > > of logical possibility, so the physical > > > systems can't do anything its abstract counterpart > > > cannot do, so what is true of the abstract system > > > is true of any phsycial systems that really instantiates it. > > > > I agree. However what I'm saying is that in a world of contingent > > existence *everything* is contingently instantiated. > > What does instantiation have to do with truth ? > > > Consequently, > > neither 'physical possibility' nor 'logical possibility' can escape > > dependency on such instantiation. > > Logical possibility is defined in terms of contradiciton. > Why should it turn out to be nonetheless dependent > on instantiation ? > > > In a world of contingent existence > > the elevation of any 'necessary truth' above contingency is dubious and > > possibly incoherent. > > I don't see why. You just seem to be treating > truth and existence as interchangeable, which > begs the questions AFAICS. > > > To be coherent AFAICS one would need to be making > > ontic claims for 'necessary truth' that would constrain 'contingent > > possibility'. > > I have no idea what you mean by that. Why would a claim about > necessary truth be ontic rather than epistemic, for instance ? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---