Peter Jones writes:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Le 05-sept.-06, à 15:38, 1Z a écrit :
> >
> > >
> > >> The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and
> > >> self-aware
> > >
> > > Not really. They are just possibilities.
> > >
> > >>  even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in
> > >> a block of marble would be conscious
> > >> if statues were conscious and being embedded in marble did not render
> > >> them unconscious.
> > >
> > > But that gets to the heart of the paradox. You are suggesting that
> > > conscious
> > > computations are still conscious even thought hey don't exst and
> > > are mere possiiblities! That is surely a /reductio/ of one of your
> > > premisses
> >
> >
> > The everything-lister, with or without comp, takes as natural the idea
> > that all possibilities exist, and that actuality is just a possibility
> > viewed from that possibility.
> 
> Of course it is not natural, or we would not
> have two separate words for "possible" and "actual".

Where does the idea that conscious computations might only be potentially 
conscious come from? If it isn't actually conscious, then it isn't a conscious 
computation. It so happens that all the conscious beings of which we are 
aware in nature interact with their environment most of the time, but even 
if such interaction is necessary for consciousness, you could make the inputs 
part of a larger system, which is then inputless. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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