Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Le 05-sept.-06, à 15:38, 1Z a écrit : > > > > > > > > > > >> The conscious computations, on the other hand, are there and > > > >> self-aware > > > > > > > > Not really. They are just possibilities. > > > > > > > >> even though we cannot interact with them, just as all the statues in > > > >> a block of marble would be conscious > > > >> if statues were conscious and being embedded in marble did not render > > > >> them unconscious. > > > > > > > > But that gets to the heart of the paradox. You are suggesting that > > > > conscious > > > > computations are still conscious even thought hey don't exst and > > > > are mere possiiblities! That is surely a /reductio/ of one of your > > > > premisses > > > > > > > > > The everything-lister, with or without comp, takes as natural the idea > > > that all possibilities exist, and that actuality is just a possibility > > > viewed from that possibility. > > > > Of course it is not natural, or we would not > > have two separate words for "possible" and "actual". > > Where does the idea that conscious computations might only be potentially > conscious come from?
>From the ideas that: 1) A computation is only a particular computation (including one of the subset that implement consc.) under an interpretation 2) Nothing gurantees that all possible interpretations will actually be made > If it isn't actually conscious, then it isn't a conscious > computation. If there is some meaning to being actually consicous other than being acertain computation (and hence, being interpreted a certain way) a contradicion ensues. > It so happens that all the conscious beings of which we are > aware in nature interact with their environment most of the time, but even > if such interaction is necessary for consciousness, you could make the inputs > part of a larger system, which is then inputless. Is that supposed to stop it being a computation ? > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---