Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes: > > > > You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural > > > rather than > > > semantic. You only need to say that *consciousness* is structural, and > > > hence > > > non-computational. That's what some cognitive scientists have done, eg. > > > Penrose, > > > Searle, Maudlin. Personally, I don't see why there is such a disdain for > > > the idea > > > that every computation is implemented, including every conscious > > > computation. The > > > idea is still consistent with all the empirical facts, since we can only > > > interact > > > with a special subset of computations, implemented on conventional > > > computers and > > > brains. > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > Unless you can say what it is about a computation that makes it a unique > > computation > > to us and what it is about a computation that makes is conscious, then > > nothing has > > been gained. Clearly it is not true that we can interact only with > > computations in > > brains and computers. We can interact with pool balls and molecules and > > weather and > > lots of other things. > > > > Brent Meeker > > The difference between conscious and non-conscious computations is that the > latter do not need an observer, or an interaction with the environment, to be > meaningful. Take a very simple physical system like an abacus: you slide 2 > beads to the left, then another 3 beads, count how many beads there are now > on the left, and the abacus has computed 2+3=5. Next, you look out the > window, see 2 birds land on a wire, then another 3 birds, count a total of 5 > birds, and the bird-wire system has also computed 2+3=5. Or you observe a > flock of birds of which 2 are red landing on a tree, and another flock of > which 3 are red landing on the neighbouring tree, count all the red birds, > and that system has now computed 2+3=5. Clearly there are countless physical > systems everywhere computing 2+3=5, but only a small proportion of them are > interesting: those which are meaningful to an observer. (Whether you say the > accidental computations are not really worthy of the term "computation", or > perhap s should be called "potential computations", is a matter of taste, and does not change the facts). > Now, suppose some more complex variant of 3+2=3 implemented on your abacus > has consciousness associated with it, which is just one of the tenets of > computationalism. Some time later, you are walking in the Amazon rain forest > and notice that > ****under a certain mapping**** > of birds to beads and trees to wires, the forest is implementing the same > computation as your abacus was. So if your abacus was conscious, and > computationalism is true, the tree-bird sytem should also be conscious. No necessarily, because the mapping is required too. Why should it still be conscious if no-one is around to make the mapping. You could say that the potential/actual difference doesn matter, but the claim that all possibilities exist, is the central claim of everythingism, and therefor cannot be introduced as a premise in an argument to support Everythingism without begging the question. > Moreover, whereas the 2+3=5 computation is only interesting if someone > observes it, the conscious computation is just as interesting *to itself* > whether anyone else is able to observe it or not. Providing it doesn't need an external mapping. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
