Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Peter Jones writes:
> > >
> > > [Stathis Papaioannou]
> > > > > > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is
> > > > > > equivalent to the situation where every
> > > > > > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation
> > > > > > exists implemented on some computer or
> > > > > > brain in a material multiverse. This gives rise to the issues of
> > > > > > quantum immortality and the white rabbit
> > > > > > problem, as discussed at great length in the past on this list.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > One way to discredit all this foolishness is to abandon
> > > > > > computationalism...
> > >
> > > [Brent Meeker]
> > > > > I don't see how assuming consciousness is non-computational solves
> > > > > any of these
> > > > > conundrums about every object implementing every possible computation.
> > >
> > > > It would mean that every object implementing every possible computation
> > > > doesn't
> > > > imply that every object is conscious. Of course, one can also deny
> > > > that conclusion be regading computation as structural rather than
> > > > semantic.
> > >
> > > You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural
> > > rather than semantic. You only need to say
> > > that *consciousness* is structural, and hence non-computational. That's
> > > what some cognitive scientists have done,
> > > eg. Penrose, Searle, Maudlin. Personally, I don't see why there is such a
> > > disdain for the idea that every computation
> > > is implemented, including every conscious computation. The idea is still
> > > consistent with all the empirical facts, since
> > > we can only interact with a special subset of computations, implemented
> > > on conventional computers and brains.
> > Occam's razor, It is an unncessary complication.
> No, it's simpler. You would otherwise have to come up with an explanation as
> to why only particular conscious computations are implemented, and it is that
> which would make the theory more complicated than it needs to be.
That just goes back to the basic contingency of the universe. "Only
some conputations are implemented" is a special case of "only some
Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they
still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl*
(or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do.
is broad but flat). Since no-one can explain why matter is impossible
(as opposed to merely unnecesary) the non-existence of matter is
a contingent fact.
Well, perhaps there is a version of Everyhtingism that deals with
All Kinds of Everything, but it is hard to even put a meaning on
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