Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > [Stathis Papaioannou] > > > > > > If every computation is implemented everywhere anyway, this is > > > > > > equivalent to the situation where every > > > > > > computation exists as a platonic object, or every computation > > > > > > exists implemented on some computer or > > > > > > brain in a material multiverse. This gives rise to the issues of > > > > > > quantum immortality and the white rabbit > > > > > > problem, as discussed at great length in the past on this list. > > > > > > > > > > > > One way to discredit all this foolishness is to abandon > > > > > > computationalism... > > > > > > [Brent Meeker] > > > > > I don't see how assuming consciousness is non-computational solves > > > > > any of these > > > > > conundrums about every object implementing every possible computation. > > > > > > > It would mean that every object implementing every possible computation > > > > doesn't > > > > imply that every object is conscious. Of course, one can also deny > > > > that conclusion be regading computation as structural rather than > > > > semantic. > > > > > > You don't have to go as far as saying that *computation* is structural > > > rather than semantic. You only need to say > > > that *consciousness* is structural, and hence non-computational. That's > > > what some cognitive scientists have done, > > > eg. Penrose, Searle, Maudlin. Personally, I don't see why there is such a > > > disdain for the idea that every computation > > > is implemented, including every conscious computation. The idea is still > > > consistent with all the empirical facts, since > > > we can only interact with a special subset of computations, implemented > > > on conventional computers and brains. > > > > > > Occam's razor, It is an unncessary complication. > > No, it's simpler. You would otherwise have to come up with an explanation as > to why only particular conscious computations are implemented, and it is that > which would make the theory more complicated than it needs to be. That just goes back to the basic contingency of the universe. "Only some conputations are implemented" is a special case of "only some things exist". Rationalists, and hence everythingists, are no better off because they still have to appeal to some contingent brute fact, that *onl* mathemematical (or computational) entities exist, even if *all* such entities do. (Platonia is broad but flat). Since no-one can explain why matter is impossible (as opposed to merely unnecesary) the non-existence of matter is a contingent fact. Well, perhaps there is a version of Everyhtingism that deals with All Kinds of Everything, but it is hard to even put a meaning on that... --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
