Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > > I'm not sure how the multiverse comes into the discussion, but you have > > > made the point several times that a computation depends on an observer > > > > > > No, I haven't! I have tried ot follow through the consequences of > > assuming it must. > > It seems to me that some sort of absurdity or contradiction ensues. > > OK. This has been a long and complicated thread. > > > > for its meaning. I agree, but *if* computations can be conscious > > > (remember, > > > this is an assumption) then in that special case an external observer is > > > not > > > needed. > > > > Why not ? (Well, I would be quite happy that a conscious > > computation would have some inherent structural property -- > > I want to foind out why *you* would think it doesn't). > > I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a conscious > computation has some inherent structural property.
I fail to see why. Computations obviously do have structural properties. Why shouldn't consciousness supervene on them ? > Opponents of computationalism > have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any > conscious > computation as evidence that there is something special and non-computational > about the brain. Yes, but "anything implements any computation" isn't a legitimate conclusion of computationalism or anything else. That being the case, there is no need for special pleading for consciousness. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
