Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent meeker writes: > > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a > > >>>conscious > > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of > > >>>computationalism > > >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any > > >>>conscious > > >>>computation as evidence that there is something special and > > >>>non-computational > > >>>about the brain. Maybe they're right. > > >>> > > >>>Stathis Papaioannou > > >> > > >>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible > > >>computation > > >>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some > > >>special > > >>structure are conscious. > > > > > > > > > It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only > > > computations > > > implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. > > > You need the > > > hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a > > > God-given programming > > > language against which candidate computations can be measured. > > > > I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-) > > > > Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical > > sample argues > > for embodiment. > > > > Brent Meeker > > I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in > rather simple cases, > like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and it > can also be implemented > so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5 oranges, or 3 > oranges and 2 apples, > or 3 pairs of oranges and 2 triplets of apples, and so on, in infinite > variety. The difficulty is that if we > say that "3+2=5" as exemplified by 3 oranges and 2 apples is conscious, then > should we also say > that the pairs+triplets of fruit are also conscious?
No, they are only subroutines. > If so, where do we draw the line? At specific structures > That is what I mean > when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system. The > physical structure and activity > of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that of > computer B implementing > program b, but program b may be an emulation of program a, which should make > the two machines > functionally equivalent and, under computationalism, equivalently conscious. So ? If the functional equivalence doesn't depend on a baroque-reinterpretation, where is the problem ? > Maybe this is wrong, eg. > there is something special about the insulation in the wires of machine A, so > that only A can be conscious. > But that is no longer computationalism. No. But what would force that conclusion on us ? Why can't consciousness attach to features more gneral than hardware, but less general than one of your re-interpretations ? > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---